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NO DISTINCTIONS EXCEPT THOSE WHICH
MERIT ORIGINATES: THE UNLAWFULNESS OF
LEGACY PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES
Steve D. Shadowen*
Sozi P. Tulante
Shara L. Alpern

INTRODUCTION
Legacy preferences in college admissions infringe
fundamental American values. Preferring the applications of
alumni children gives them a substantial benefit based not on
merit,
but
lineage-on
the
identity,
status,
or
accomplishments of their parents. Inherited preferences for
publicly-available goods are appropriate only in status-based,
feudal societies,' not in one founded on equality and
committed to social and economic mobility based on talent
and merit.2
* This Article benefited greatly from close readings and insightful comments by
Joshua Paul Davis, Seth Kreimer, Carlton Larson, Goodwin Liu, Joe Lukens,
Jay Mootz, Morey Myers, Mark Rahdert, Gast6n de los Reyes, Jr., and Dan
Segal, and from additional guidance and comments by Garrett Epps, Tom
Odom, and Art Spitzer. Jason Reimer, Tara O'Neil, and Nancy Ed provided
cheerful and invaluable research and administrative assistance.
Peter
Malishka of Nickerson Associates performed the regression analyses discussed
infra Part IIIC.
The authors owe special thanks to Goodwin Liu for
encouraging us to fully explore the 39th Congress's rejection of the linkage
between citizenship and lineage. The generosity and talent of these colleagues
are sources of wonder.
1. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA 34 (1989) ("In feudal
society the law effectively governing an individual's rights and obligationsand, especially, privileges-was very much the product of his personal status.").
2. See JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 549 (2005)

(legacy preferences are "a peculiar practice more suited to feudal aristocracy
than a society that prides itself on its commitment to equality of opportunity");
MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE

FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 330 (1995) (legacy preferences have made the
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Without any substantial legal analysis, commentators
have generally assumed that the Equal Protection Guarantee
does not prohibit public universities from granting legacy
preferences. 3
Professor Larson has recently argued that
legacy preferences in public universities violate the
Constitution's prohibition on granting titles of nobility, but he
leaves untested the conventional wisdom that the preferences
do not offend the Equal Protection Guarantee. 4 Two early
commentators said that legacy preferences cannot survive
even rational-basis scrutiny under the Guarantee, but they,
too, provided no substantive legal analysis.5
This article fills that gap, examining in detail the
relevant legislative history and case law under the Equal
Protection Guarantee.
And given the close relationship
between the Guarantee and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,6 we
Ivy League "a credentialing institution for a social oligarchy"); PETER SCHMIDT,
COLOR AND MONEY: How RICH WHITE KIDS ARE WINNING THE WAR OVER
COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 3 (2007) ("[Slelective colleges can much more
accurately be described as bastions of privilege."); Jacques Steinberg, Of
Sheepskins and Greenbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at Al (legacy
preferences are "a relic of white supremacy and Northeastern establishment
dominance"); see also Goodwin Liu, Race, Class, Diversity, Complexity, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 289, 301 (2004) ("[Olur best schools [should] be a beacon of
opportunity to students from every station in life, and not just an entitlement of
the well-heeled.").
3. See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Affirmative Action and the Decline of
Intellectual Culture, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 5 (2005); John D. Lamb, The Real
Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preference at Harvardand Yale, 26 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 491, 512 (1993). In Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice Thomas
stated, without analysis, that "the Equal Protection Clause does not.., prohibit
the use of unseemly legacy preferences or many other kinds of arbitrary
admissions procedures."
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Hopwood v.
Texas, 783 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating in dicta that "an admissions
process may also consider an applicant's . . .relationship to school alumni");
Rosenstock v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of North Carolina, 423 F. Supp.
1321 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (upholding legacy preferences where plaintiff did not
contend that they used a suspect classification). But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 135
F. Supp. 2d 790, 802 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (referring in dicta to legacy status as a
"suspect criter[ion]").
4. See Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of Nobility, HereditaryPrivilege, and the
Unconstitutionality of Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1375 (2007).
5. See Ernest Gellhorn & D. Brock Hornby, Constitutional Limitations On
Admissions Procedures and Standards-Beyond Affirmative Action, 60 VA. L.
REv. 975, 1006 (1974).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (re-enacted in the
Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140). Section 1 of the Act
originally provided, in relevant part,
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canvass the latter's legislative history and case law as well.
We conclude that legacy preferences in both public and
private universities are presumptively unlawful.
That conclusion is grounded in history. The Founders
intended to establish a society based on individual merit
rather than the hereditary distinctions of the feudal societies
that the colonists had abandoned. Accordingly, the principle
against hereditary distinctions is reflected in the history and
text of both the Declaration of Independence and the 1787
Constitution, including the Guaranty Clause, the ban on
titles of nobility, and the "corruption of blood" clauses.7
This principle did not remain a mere ideal but was given
the force of positive law by the 39th Congress in the wake of
the Civil War. Three aspects of the debates on the 1866 Act
and the Guarantee show that the Republicans who dominated
that Congress rejected distinctions based on heredity or
family lineage.
First, the Republicans understood the Declaration's
statement that all men are created equal-what Lincoln
described as the "white man's charter of freedom"specifically to reject hereditary distinctions among white
men. The abolitionists and Radical Republicans urged that
this principle be broadened to prohibit discrimination against
African Americans. The 39th Congress codified the
Declaration's principle against hereditary distinctions among
white men and extended it to proscribe discrimination based
on inherited race.'
Second, the Republicans believed that the essential
conflict was between the democracy of the North and the
aristocracy of the South. Lincoln and other Republicans
that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color,
. . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens ....
The portion of this Act that we are concerned with-the prohibition on
discrimination in the right "to make and enforce contracts"--is currently
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
7. See infra Part IIAla.
8. See infra Part IIAlb.
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thought that the southern aristocrats were "restoring
[principles] of classification, caste and legitimacy" that posed
a danger to the democratic institutions and people of the
North. Providing each citizen with the "same right" to make
and enforce contracts, and with equal protection of the laws,
the Republicans intended both the 1866 Act and the Equal
Protection Guarantee to be bulwarks against a status-based
southern aristocracy. 9
Third, the Republicans' Free Labor ideology asserted that
each worker, if allowed the fruits of his labor, could achieve
social and economic mobility. This guiding Republican
ideology was incompatible not only with southern slavery, but
also with the condition of southern white laborers who had no
hope of ever rising through southern society.
The
Republicans of the 39th Congress believed that the right to
contract was among the fundamental rights necessary to
secure the fruits of labor and thus ensure social mobility.
These rights were codified in the 1866 Act and then made
part of the organic law of the land in the Fourteenth
Amendment.'1
The 1866 Act implemented the ban on hereditary
distinctions by providing that all "citizens" shall have the
same right to make and enforce contracts, and by defining a
citizen as anyone (with limited exceptions) who was born in
the United States. Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred
Scott had held that U.S. citizenship was determined by
lineage-that citizenship was restricted to lineal descendents
of those who were citizens when the Constitution was
adopted. Likewise, the southern States had defined State
citizenship specifically by reference to family lineage, denying
citizenship to children of "colored" mothers, whether free or
slave. The 1866 Act rejected such citizenship-by-lineage,
confirming the rejection of lineage as a basis for
discrimination in the Act's citizenship-based substantive
rights. The Republicans ultimately viewed even the 1866 Act
as too status-based, so they extended the Equal Protection
Guarantee to "all persons" rather than only citizens."
This legislative history, reflecting both the Republicans'
own bases for the Civil War and their understanding of the
9. See infra Part IIA2.
10. See infra Part 11A3.
11. See infra Part IIA4.
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Founders' principles, shows that the right to be free from
discrimination based on heredity or lineage is a foundational
right enjoyed by Americans.
From the nation's founding, the social movement against
hereditary distinctions has been so successful that litigation
against such distinctions simpliciter is rare. 2
Instead,
litigation has focused on efforts to realize the full meaning of
"equality," beyond its origins in the principle against
hereditary preferences. 13
As we show below, however,
Supreme Court precedent amply supports the application of
strict scrutiny to hereditary distinctions under the Equal
Protection Guarantee, and likewise supports a challenge to
those distinctions under the 1866 Act. This existing case law,
especially when supplemented with the extensive legislative
history developed below, provides a sound basis for litigation
against legacy preferences in college admissions.
We also suggest that legacy preferences will not survive
the strict scrutiny to which they are subject. The universities'
principal justification for legacy preferences-that they result
in increased alumni donations-is not legally cognizable. An
otherwise unlawful preference is not redeemed because its
beneficiaries are willing to pay for it.14 In any event, analysis
of extensive data from more than 100 elite universities shows
12. See J. M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L. J. 2313, 2350
(1997) (noting that the title of nobility clauses "have little meaning for us today
precisely because of the success of the American Revolution in dismantling a
profound and pervasive form of status hierarchy"). Legacy preferences have
survived into the twenty-first century because they benefit the nation's political
elites. See DANIEL GOLDEN, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION 234 (2006) (noting "the

bipartisan array of powerful insiders in the executive branch, Congress, and the
judiciary who sent their children to their old schools or who are themselves
legacies"); see also Cameron Howell & Sarah E. Turner, Legacies In Black and
White: The Racial Composition of the Legacy Pool, 45 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC.

325, 329 (2004).
13. We should emphasize the modesty of what we claim in this article. For
example, there is a rich literature asserting that the Equal Protection
Guarantee prohibits the States from treating identifiable groups as "secondclass citizens." See, e.g., KARST, supra note 1; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme
Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994). Our analysis supports those claims,
but is not dependent on them. We argue only that, whatever the ultimate scope
of the Guarantee, its drafters at a minimum intended it to give effect to the
anti-hereditary-distinction principle of the Founders. Our argument does not
require courts to expand the concept of equality, but only to remember its
origin.
14. See infra Part IIIB.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

that legacy preferences are not correlated with increased
alumni giving rates, and are likely not correlated with
increased private donations. 5
I.

THE UGLY HISTORY AND UNTENABLE FUTURE OF
LEGACY PREFERENCES

Jerome Karabel has documented the origin of legacy
preferences in 1920s anti-Semitic efforts at Harvard, Yale,
and Princeton that were implemented to stem an influx of the
"wrong" types of students. 16 Legacy preferences shielded
WASP applicants from unwelcome Jewish and Catholic
competition. 7 Today the preferences insulate the children of
alumni from full competition with other applicants and from
the reduced admissions spaces resulting from affirmative
action for minorities. ' 8
Our research shows that fifty-two of sixty-eight top
national universities and fifty of fifty-three of the best liberal
arts colleges currently grant legacy preferences.' 9 These
preferences at elite universities give an advantage to alumni
children equivalent to an extra twenty-three to 160 SAT
points (on a 1600-point scale).' ° The legacy admissions rate,
15. See infra Part IIIC.
16. See KARABEL, supra note 2, at 76. Quotas on admission of Jewish
students betrayed the schools' public statements against racial prejudice and in
favor of admission based on merit. Id. at 198, 207; SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at
24.
17. See KARABEL, supra note 2, at 76, 102, 114-17; see also JOSEPH A.
SOARES, THE POWER OF PRIVILEGE 48-50 (2007); Lamb, supra note 3, at 493.

18. KARABEL, supra note 2, at 521; see The Curse of Nepotism, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 1, 2004, at 27; see generally SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at 211 (noting that,
after the Grutter and Gratz decisions, civil rights organizations lost interest in
attacking legacy preferences).
19. We gathered data on the top seventy-five national universities and top
seventy-five liberal arts colleges as ranked in the 2007 U.S. News & World
Report. See our database, described infra Part IIIC.
20. See GOLDEN, supra note 12, at 131; SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at 31;
Thomas J. Espenshade, Chang Y. Chung, & Joan L. Walling, Admission
Preferences for Minority Students, Athletes, and Legacies at Elite Universities,
85 SOC. SCI. Q. 1422 (2004); Howell & Turner, supra note 12, at 329; Douglas S.
Massey & Margarita Mooney, The Effects of America's Three Affirmative
Programs on Academic Performance, 54 SOC. PROBS. 99, 109 (2007). The
Department of Education in 1990 found that beneficiaries of legacy preferences
at Harvard were "significantly less qualified" than their non-legacy peers in
academics, extra-curriculars, personal qualities, and recommendations-in all
categories except athletics. See Letter and Enclosure: Statement of Findings,
Compliance Review 01-88-6009 from Thomas J. Hibino, Acting Reg'l Director of
U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, to Derek Bok, President of Harvard
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as compared to the overall admissions rate, is shown here for
some of the nation's elite private institutions:
Table 1. Overall Admit Rate and Legacy Admit Rate

Amherst f

2005

Overall Admit
Rate (%)
20

Bowdoina

1980

21

52

Columbiac

1993

32

51

Dartmoutha

1991

27

57

Harvarde

2002

11

40

Middleburyb

2006

27

45

Notre Dame'

2005

20

50

Pennsylvaniad

2004

21

51

Princetone

2002

10

35

Stanfordb

2006

13

25

Yalee

2002

11

29

Legacy Admit
Rate (%)
50

a John D. Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preference at
Harvard and Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 506 n.94 (1993).
b Jacques Steinberg, Of Sheepskins and Greenbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2003, at Al.
c Theodore Cross, Suppose There Was No Affirmative Action at the Most
Prestigious Colleges and Graduate Schools, 3 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 44,
47 (1994).
d Douglas S. Massey & Margarita Mooney, The Effects of America's Three
Affirmative Programs on Academic Performance, 54 SOC. PROBS. 99, 100
(2007).
e JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION AND
EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 521, 550 (2005).
f DANIEL GOLDEN, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION 131, 228 (2006). The figures for
Amherst represent a fifteen-year average. Id. at 288.

Among flagship State universities, there is wide
variability in the magnitude of the preference.
At the
University of Michigan, for instance, in 2003 legacy status
garnered four of the 100 points required for admission. 21 The
Univ., at 37 (Oct. 4, 1990) (on file with author).
21. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 278 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). By comparison, an applicant's personal achievements, leadership,
and public service could garner a total of only five points. Id. In the wake of
Gratz, the University of Michigan eliminated its point system, but legacy status,
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University of Virginia's admission rate for legacy applicants
is fifty-seven percent versus an overall rate of twenty-three
percent.2 2
A major Midwestern land-grant research
university, ranked among the top 100 national schools by
U.S. News & World Report, automatically admits all alumni
children unless their SAT scores put them in the bottom
twenty-five percent of applicants.2 3
At both public and private schools, the relative advantage
conferred by legacy preferences is increasing as intensified
competition drives overall admission rates lower.2 4 At
preference-granting elite schools, legacy applicants typically
represent ten to fifteen percent of admittees,2 5 as compared to
1.5% at CalTech, which grants no preferences.2 6 The number
of legacy admittees is often double the total number of
enrolled African Americans."
Legacy preferences are opposed by three-quarters of
Americans" and by advocacy groups and political leaders of
diverse ideological stripes.2 9 But the wealth and political
clout of the elite universities, and the fact that legislators and
their children are among the direct beneficiaries of legacy
which is specifically noted on the admissions rating sheet, is still "taken into
account" in the admissions process. Telephone Interview with Admissions
Official, Univ. of Mich. (Apr. 2008).
22. Howell & Turner, supra note 12, at 333.
23. Research Assistant's December 2007 Telephone Interview with
Admissions Official. Even legacy applicants in the bottom twenty-five percent
can be denied admission only on the approval of the Dean of Admissions. Id.
24. See KARABEL, supra note 2, at 550.
25. See GOLDEN, supra note 12, at 121-22; see also SCHMIDT, supra note 2,
at 30.
26. See GOLDEN, supra note 12, at 262.
27. See Naked Hypocrisy: The Nationwide System of Affirmative Action for
Whites, 18 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 40, 41 (1997-98). Today at the University

of Notre Dame, legacy beneficiaries comprise twenty-five percent of the student
body; African Americans four percent. GOLDEN, supra note 12, at 118.
28. Jeffery Selingo, U.S. Public's Confidence in Colleges Remains High, 50
available
at
EDUC.
Al
(2004),
CHRON.
HIGHER
http://chronicle.com/free/v50/i35/35a00101.htm.
29. See, e.g., Ben Adler, Inside the HigherEd Lobby: Welcome to One Dupont
Circle, Where Good Education-Reform Ideas Go to Die, 39 WASH. MONTHLY 35
(2007) (discussing Senator Kennedy's opposition); Peter Schmidt, New Pressure
Put on Colleges to End Legacies in Admissions, 50 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. Al

(2004) (noting Center for Individual Rights' opposition); Elisabeth Bumiller,
Bush, a Yale Legacy, Says Colleges Should Not Give Preference to Children of
Alumni, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2004, at A12; John Edwards, Op-Ed., End Special
Privilege, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 2004, at 12A; Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class
(2000),
in
College
Admissions
Affirmative
Action
Based
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/Education/AffirmativeAction.pdf.
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preferences, make a legislative solution unlikely.3"
This poses a significant problem because generations of
Americans have viewed higher education as the fundamental
engine of social and economic mobility. 31 Equal access to
higher education, and especially to elite schools, plays a vital
role in sustaining the legitimacy of "our democratic ideal of
equal opportunity for all."32 That legitimacy will erode if
access to elite higher education is seen, at best, as reflecting
society's substantial inequality and social stratification, and,
at worst, as a means of reproducing it.
The class
stratification at elite universities is now scandalous.
The
average family income of students at these schools is more
than twice that of students in other universities. 4
The effect of parents' educational backgrounds on
admission to elite institutions has grown exponentially over

30. See GOLDEN, supra note 12, at 124 (twelve elite universities account for
fifty-four percent of corporate leaders and forty-two percent of government
leaders); Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals As PoliticalActs: Guardians at the
Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 115 n.5 (2003) (noting
that a small group of schools produces a disproportionate number of U.S.
Senators, Representatives, and judges); see also SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at 11.
31. See ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & STEPHEN J. ROSE, SOCIOECONOMIC
STATUS, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND SELECTIVE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 29 (2003).
32. Guinier, supra note 30, at 137-38; see WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK
BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING
RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 276 (1998) (admission to elite
universities "is an exceedingly valuable resource-valuable both to the students
admitted and to the society at large-which is why admissions need to be based
'on the merits"); PETER SACKS, TEARING DOWN THE GATES: CONFRONTING THE
CLASS DIVIDE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 122 (2007) ("[Flor any nation that
purports to uphold egalitarian and democratic values, it matters who is
educated at these [elite] institutions."); John K. Wilson, The Myth of Reverse
Discriminationin Higher Education, 10 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 88, 93 (199596) (C[T] hese elite degrees are part of an intricate certification process that gives
their recipients a huge advantage in the job market and a network of alums to
help them.").
33. See CARNEVALE & ROSE, supra note 31, at 11, 32; JOHN AUBREY
DOUGLASS, THE CONDITIONS FOR ADMISSION: ACCESS, EQUITY AND THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT OF PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 246 (2007); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE
REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 146 (1996); DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY, ET AL., THE SOURCE OF THE RIVER: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF
FRESHMEN AT AMERICA'S SELECTIVE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 43 (2003);
SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at 17; Liu, supra note 2, at 292-93; Walter Benn
Michaels, Why Identity Politics Distracts Us From Economic Inequalities, 53
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. B10 (2006).
34. SACKS, supra note 32, at 156; see also SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at 4 ("[A]
rich child has about 25 times as much chance as a poor one of someday enrolling
in a college rated as highly selective or better.").
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the last decades. 5 From 1971 to 2000, the proportion of
students in elite universities whose parents were highly
educated grew from twenty-eight percent to sixty-one percent,
while those whose parents had no college education declined
from twenty-five percent to nine percent. 6 Legacy preferences
deter the advancement of children from low-income, loweducation families while artificially propping up the children
from high-income, high-education families. They are a signal
to low and moderate-income students that the gates to the
highest stations in society are closed to them. 7
It is against this background that legacy preferences at
elite universities are judged. Access to higher education is
widely seen as a primary means of social mobility; elite
higher education is in fact a principal means of gaining access
to economic, cultural, and political power; and low-income
applicants already face a significant disadvantage in meeting
"objective" criteria that systematically favor those with welleducated and well-off parents. The question is whether in
addition to these de facto disadvantages, low-income and
other wrong-birth students should face the de jure
disadvantage of an expressly inherited attribute that, by
definition, is possessed almost exclusively by those at the top
of the socioeconomic order.

35. Upper-class parents, who themselves tend to be college graduates, have
the social and economic capital to help their children succeed on SAT tests and
other "objective" measures of merit. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 32, at 49;
Guinier, supra note 30, at 146 n.135, 149 n.148. Indeed, SAT scores tend to rise
in lockstep with family income. See CARNEVALE & ROSE, supra note 31, at 34;
KAHLENBERG, supra note 33, at 99; see also SACKS, supra note 32, at 14-15
(summarizing studies showing overwhelming effects of family background and
wealth on educational attainment).
36. SACKS, supra note 32, at 123-24.
37. More than 5000 high schools nationwide graduated students in 2004
with qualifications sufficient for admission to Harvard, but did not have a single
student apply there. See Large Numbers of Highly Qualified, Low-Income
Students Are Not Applying to Harvard and Other Highly Selective Schools, J.
BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. (2006), http://www.jbhe.com/newsviews/52_low-incomestudents.html; see generally LIND, supra note 2, at 331 ("In an industrial,
bureaucratic society in which access to wealth and power depend on educational
credentials, alumni preference in university admissions is the managerialprofessional equivalent of primogeniture.").
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II. LEGACY PREFERENCES, IN BOTH PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES, ARE PRESUMPTIVELY
UNLAWFUL
Admissions decisions at public universities are subject to
the strictures of the Equal Protection Guarantee.3 We show
in detail below that the Supreme Court has held that
discrimination by government based on "ancestry," including
39
an individual's family lineage, is inherently suspect.
Admissions decisions in private universities are unlikely to be
held to constitute "state action" and are thus likely beyond
the reach of the Guarantee. 40 But the Civil Rights Act of 1866
does reach private schools and it prohibits discrimination
based on "race" in their admissions decisions.4 1 We show that
the Court has construed "race" broadly under the 1866 Act to
prohibit private discrimination based on "ancestry," and in
dicta has indicated that "race" includes family lineage.4 2
Our analysis begins, however, with a detailed review of
the legislative history of the Act and the Guarantee. That
history, which establishes that Congress intended both
provisions to prohibit discrimination based on family lineage,
provides an important adjunct to the Court's cases addressing
discrimination based on the identity, status, or conduct of an
individual's parents.
A. The 39th CongressIntended to ProtectAll Citizens from
DiscriminationBased on Lineage.
The legislative history of the 1866 Act and the Joint
Resolution that became the Fourteenth Amendment shows
that Congress considered the prohibition of discrimination
based on heredity or family lineage to be essential to the
foundation of American society.
That discrimination is
subject to strict scrutiny because Congress intended the 1866
38. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003).
39. See infra Part IB.
40. See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.
2000); see generally Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
41. See infra text accompanying note 283. For ease of reference, and to
emphasize the history of the statute, we refer throughout this article to the
"1866 Act." The currently effective provision, found at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991),
provides, in relevant part, that, "[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right ...
to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens....

42. See infra Part ICI.
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Act and Guarantee to proscribe it. 43
1.

The 39th Congress Codified and Extended to All
Americans the PrincipleAgainst Hereditary
DistinctionsThat Was Established in the Declaration
of Independence and the EgalitarianProvisions of the
1787 Constitution.

The drafters of the 1866 Act intended to codify, for the
first time in history, the principle of equality that the
Founders inscribed in the Declaration and in the Guaranty
Clause and other egalitarian provisions of the 1787
Constitution. So an understanding of the 1866 Act begins
with understanding what the Founders were rebelling
against.
When they asserted that "all [white] men are
created equal," what then-extant distinctions among white
men were they rejecting?
a.

The Declarationand EgalitarianProvisions of
the 1787 ConstitutionEstablished a Principle
Against HereditaryDistinctions.

A primary purpose of the Revolution was to reject a
society based on hereditary privilege in favor of one founded
on the equality of white men.44 Before the Revolution, many
still believed that the aristocracy and common people were so
different that they were "two orders of being."" There were
widespread calls for the creation of a titled nobility or life
peerage in the colonies to counter-balance the power of the
king, on the one hand, and the elected assemblies, on the
43. A classification is "suspect" not only when modern criteria would so

categorize it, but also when the legislative history shows that Congress intended
to proscribe discrimination on that basis. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 23 (1948) (Guarantee must be construed according to what "the framers
sought to achieve"); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879)
(Guarantee must be construed according to "the times when [it was] adopted,
and the general objects [it] plainly sought to accomplish").
44. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1992); Mark E. Brandon, Family at the Birth of the American
Constitutional Order, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1195, 1206-17, 1223-25 (1999); Richard
Delgado, An Equality 'From The Top. Applying An Ancient ProhibitionTo An
Emerging Problem Of DistributiveJustice, 32 UCLA L. REV. 100, 109-13 (1984);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the
Transformationof Culture Through AntidiscriminationLaws, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1588, 1600-02 (1997); James W. Torke, Nepotism and the Constitution: The
Kotch Case-A Specimen in Amber, 47 LOY. L. REV. 561, 611-18 (2001).
45. WOOD, supra note 44, at 27.
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other.4 6 But the Revolution, "conceived in the spirit of equal
rights and privileges," made the "creat[ion] [ofi a privileged
order... unthinkable."4' 7
As shown by Gordon Wood, the Revolution pitted patriots
against "courtiers," persons "whose position or rank came
artificially from above-from hereditary or personal
connections that ultimately flowed from the crown or court."4"
The essence of republicanism was that "a man's merit [would]
rest entirely with himself, without any regard to family,
blood, or connection."4 9 The rallying cry was equality of
opportunity, which rejected hereditary privileges and
embraced "social movement both up and down founded on
individual ability and character."50 In short, the Revolution
was "a vindication of frustrated talent at the expense of birth
and blood."'"
i.

The Declaration

The rejection of hereditary privilege was made explicit in
the Declaration of Independence. Jefferson was driven by the
desire to abolish the aristocracy of birth and in its stead to
erect an "aristocracy of virtue and talent, which nature has
wisely provided for the direction of the interests of society, &
scattered with equal hand through all it's (sic) conditions."52
46. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 272-280 (enlarged ed. 1992); see also ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE
AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 125 (2005); MARK PULS, SAMUEL ADAMS:
FATHER OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49 (2006).
47. BAILYN, supra note 46, at 281.
48. WOOD, supra note 44, at 175.
49. Id. at 180 (quoting STEPHEN BURROUGHS, MEMOIRS OF STEPHEN
BURROUGHS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 3 (1988)).
50. Id. at 233-34; see also id. at 195; BAILYN, supra note 46, at 319
(Revolution ensured that "the status of men flowed from their achievements and
from their personal qualities, not from distinctions ascribed to them at birth").
51. WOOD, supra note 44, at 180; see also HARRY V. JAFFA, ANEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM 408 (2000) ("[Ihf the American Revolution meant anything at all, it
meant that no man ought to be limited by the condition into which he is born.");
Balkin, supra note 12, at 2316 ("America's commitment to a democratic culture
began with the social revolution against aristocratic privilege that formed the

basis of the American Revolution."); Larson, supra note 4, at 1384 (hereditary
distinctions "were unthinkable in a nation founded upon principles of equality").
52. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS
32 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). Jefferson believed that inherited privileges
were a principal cause of European poverty. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN
SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 112 (2005); see also
YEHOSHUA ARIELI, INDIVIDUALISM AND NATIONALISM IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGY

78 (1964). Like many others, he also thought that the American Revolution was

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

Democratic society arrays "science, talents and courage
against rank and birth" and thus ensures that "rank, and
birth, and tinsel-aristocracy will finally shrink into
53
insignificance.
Accordingly, the Declaration asserts independence not in
the name of an aristocracy or the gentry, but "in the Name,
and by the Authority of the good People of the Colonies." The
first self-evident truth invoked by the people is that "all men
are created equal."
Jefferson understood the "natural
equality of man" to encompass "particularly the denial of a
preeminence by birth."5 4 On the fiftieth anniversary of the
Declaration, Jefferson famously wrote that the Revolution
had been founded on the principle that "the mass of mankind
has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored
few, booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by
the grace of God."5"
The origin of the Declaration confirms its rejection of
hereditary distinctions among white men. Jefferson's close
friend, Tom Paine, shared with him "an egalitarian vision of
the first step in a global evolution from feudalism and monarchy to equality and
democracy. Ellis, supra at 128.
53. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 1309-10; see generally Ellis, supra
note 52, at 249 (discussing Jefferson-Adams correspondence regarding
aristocracy). It is easy for us today to see hypocrisy in the Founders' failure to
immediately extend the no-hereditary-distinction principle to African
Americans.
Enemies of the Declaration were quick to point out the
inconsistency. See CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A
STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 27 (1972). But establishing this
principle as the basis for American society ensured a future conflict between the
principle and hereditary slavery: "With the revolutionary movement, black
slavery became excruciatingly conspicuous in a way that it had not been in the
older monarchical society with its many calibrations and degrees of unfreedom.
• . . The revolution in effect set in motion ideological and social forces that
doomed the institution of slavery in the North and led inexorably to the Civil
War." WOOD, supra note 44, at 186-87.
54. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1784), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 791. Jefferson wrote this
letter to urge Washington to oppose the hereditary privileges granted by the
Society of the Cincinnati. Id. Those privileges were also opposed by John
Adams and Benjamin Franklin, who participated in drafting the Declaration.
See Larson, supra note 4, at 1393-95; see also infra text accompanying note 80.
Professor Larson illuminates the dispute over the Cincinnati and its importance
in understanding the Founders' rejection of hereditary privileges. See Larson,
supra note 4, at 1387-99; see also WOOD, supra note 44, at 241.
55. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Roger C. Weightman (June 24, 1826), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 1517; see generally Ellis,
supra note 52, at 289 (discussing provenance of Jefferson's phraseology).
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republicanism as a rejection of the class-stratified society of
the old world."5 6 Paine's enormously influential pamphlet,
Common Sense, called in January 1776 for the publication of
a "manifesto" announcing independence from Great Britain
and setting forth the principles that would make the
American Revolution more than a war for separation of one
people from another.17 On June 7, 1776, the Lee Resolutions
pressed the Continental Congress to issue the manifesto
urged by Paine,5" and on June 11 Congress gave Jefferson his
task.5 9
Paine's language and tone, designed to appeal to artisans
and mechanics as well as the political elite, was highly
original, but his theme of "the absurdity of hereditary
privilege" was a staple of Whig thought in the colonies.6 °
Common Sense asserted that, "For all men being originally
equals, no one by birth could have a right to set up his own
family in perpetual preference to all others for ever, and tho'
himself might deserve some decent degree of honours of his
cotemporaries, yet his descendants might be far too unworthy
to inherit them."" The pamphlet rejected "monarchical
tyranny in the person of the king" and "aristocratical tyranny
in the person of the peers." 62 "[O]ne honest man" was worth
more to society than "all the crowned ruffians that ever

56. FONER, supra note 46, at 103.
57. THOMAS

PAINE,

COMMON SENSE,

in

THOMAS

PAINE,

COLLECTED

WRITINGS 45 (Eric Foner ed., 1995); see generally CRAIG NELSON, THOMAS
PAINE: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION, AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN NATIONS

96-97 (2006).
58. NELSON, supra note 57, at 96-97.
59. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION

OF INDEPENDENCE 43 (1997).
60. FONER, supra note 46, at 79-80, 82; see also NELSON, supra note 57, at
80-82.
61. PAINE, supra note 57, at 16 (emphasis in original); see generally ARIELI,
supra note 52, at 71 (noting "the great influence of Common Sense on the

independence movement and on the rise of American democracy"). As
Brandon summarized, "Paine's enemy, most simply, was a system
privilege, property, and power were determined by inheritance."
supra note 44, at 1213; see also Delgado, supra note 44, at 111; see
SEAN WILENTZ,

THE RISE OF AMERICAN

DEMOCRACY

Professor
in which
Brandon,
generally

23 (2005) ("Paine

considered aristocratic government, established by a parasitic caste of the
pedigreed and privileged, as the chief author of human misery.").
62. PAINE, supra note 57, at 9. These ideas had circulated throughout the
colonies long before Paine took up his pen. See, e.g., MAIER, supra note 59, at
92-93, 128; PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION 288-94 (1972).
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lived." 3 By sweeping away the inherited privileges of the
feudal world, the new American society would "prepare in
time an asylum for mankind. '64 The enormous circulation of
Common Sense indicated the extent to which it articulated
the views of the mass of colonists,6" among whom was
Jefferson.6
The sources relied on by Jefferson also confirm the
Declaration's rejection of hereditary privileges.
When
67
drafting the Declaration, Jefferson likely had in front of him
a copy of George Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, which had been published in the Pennsylvania
Gazette on June 12, 1776.8
The Virginia Declaration
asserted, in its first article, that "all men are created equally
free and independent," and its fourth article provided that,
"no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community, but in
consideration of public services; which not being descendible,
neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to
be hereditary."69 The fourth article "repudiated the notion of
63. PAINE, supra note 57, at 20.
64. Id. at 36. For Paine, private wealth "contributed to the welfare of
society ... only if [it was] obtained by individual effort, not artificial privilege."
FONER, supra note 46, at 95. Inequalities of wealth should "reflect differences
in individual ability and effort," not "hereditary privilege, court sinecures and
governmental favors." Id. at 96.
65. See FONER, supra note 46, at 79, 82; NELSON, supra note 57, at 81;
MAIER, supra note 59, at 135.
66. Nelson asserts that "[t]here are so many common elements between
Paine's first American writings and the Declaration that some historians have
claimed that Paine himself secretly wrote it, or that Jefferson copied him so
thoroughly that it amounted to the same thing." NELSON, supra note 57, at 98.
Jefferson himself asserted that he "profess[es] the same principles" that Paine
later elaborated in the RIGHTS OF MAN. See id. at 206; see also id. at 204.
Other admirers of Paine included Presidents Jackson and Lincoln. See FONER,
supra note 46, at 269.
67. MAIER, supra note 59, at 165; Joseph J. Ellis, The Enduring Influence of
the Declaration,in WHAT DID THE DECLARATION DECLARE? 19 (Joseph J. Ellis
ed., 1999).
68. MAIER, supra note 59, at 126.
69. HELEN HILL, GEORGE MASON: CONSTITUTIONALIST 136-37 (Peter Smith
1966) (1938) (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776, as originally
drafted by Mason). In order to accommodate the institution of slavery, the
Virginia legislature qualified Mason's assertion that "all men are created
equally free and independent" by providing that men are so only "when they
enter into a state of society." See JEFF BROADWATER, GEORGE MASON:
FORGOTTEN FOUNDER 84 (2006). The influence of Mason's draft of the Virginia
Declaration on other State constitutions, the federal Bill of Rights, and the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man is discussed in Jeff Broadwater's book,
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hereditary aristocracy" and was "a succinct statement of [one
ofl the republican principles that underlay the Revolution."70
Mason's Virginia Declaration was heavily influenced by
Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government.7 1 Jefferson also
acknowledged the national Declaration's indebtedness to
Locke.72 Indeed, educated Americans in 1776 "had absorbed
Locke's works as a kind of political gospel."73
In the First Treatise, Locke rejected the intellectual
underpinnings of hereditary succession, as typified in
74 Building on that rejection, the Second
Filmer's Patriarcha.
Treatise asserts that, in the state of nature, men are in "[a]
state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction
is reciprocal, no one having more than another. . . ."'I Each
person is "equal to the greatest and subject to nobody."76
Accordingly, when men enter into a state of society,
legislators "are to govern by promulgated established laws,
not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for
rich and poor, for the favourite at Court, and the countryman
at plough. '77 The rejection of hereditary right is also the
foundation for the requirement of government by consent of
the governed: "Men being, as has been said, all free, equal,
GEORGE MASON. Id. at 90.
70. BROADWATER, supra note 69, at 81-82. George Mason had earlier
drafted the Fairfax Resolves, which announced the "fundamental principle" that
legislators must be "affected by the laws they enact equally with their
constituents, to whom they are accountable, and whose burthens they share,"
and had urged election and frequent rotation of militia officers on the ground
that, "[w] e came equals into this world, and equals we shall go out of it. All men
are by nature born equally free and independent. To protect the weaker from
the injuries and insults of the stronger were societies first formed .... Every
power, every authority vested in particular men, is, or ought to be, ultimately
directed to this sole end [of the general good of society]." HILL, supra note 69, at
113 (quoting Fairfax Resolves); id. at 118-19 (quoting Mason's speech to the
Independent Company).
On the influence of the Fairfax Resolves, see
BROADWATER, supra note 69, at 67.
71. BROADWATER, supra note 69, at 88; HILL, supra note 69, at 140.
72. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 1501.
73. BECKER, supra note 53, at 27; see also ALLEN JAYNE, JEFFERSON'S
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS, PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 56
(1998); MAIER, supra note 59, at 135; PULS, supra note 46, at 116, 185.
74. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 6-7, 64-67 (E.P.
Dutton & Co. 1953) (1689). Jefferson likely read Filmer as well as Locke's
rejection of him. See BECKER, supra note 53, at 27.
75. LOCKE, supra note 74, at 118.
76. Id. at 179.
77. Id. at 189.
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and independent, no one can be put out of his estate, and
subjected to the political power of another, without his
consent. 78 Thus, the rejection of hereditary superiority
underlies the Declaration's assertions of both equality and
the need to obtain the consent of the governed.79
Before submitting his draft to Congress, Jefferson
circulated it to John Adams and Benjamin Franklin. 80 John
Adams was a fierce opponent of inherited privileges. When
he wrote in 1766 that "all men are born equal," he intended
the phrase specifically to reject "the doctrine that a few nobles
78. Id. at 164.
79. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 53, at 64-72; JAYNE, supra note 73, at 60,
109, 137. Whether grounded in the Lockean notion of reason available to all,
e.g., BECKER, supra note 53, at 65, or in the Scottish moral philosophers' notion
of a common moral sense, e.g., JAYNE, supra note 73, at 67-72; GARY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 187, 228

(1978), Jefferson clearly repudiated the "organization of kings, hereditary
nobles, and priests," the "privileged orders [that live in] splendor and idleness
...and excite in [the people] an humble adoration and submission, as to an
order of superior beings" because "wisdom and virtue [are] not hereditary."
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Justice William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 1470. "[E]ducating the
common people" is the surest defense against the rise of "kings, priests &
nobles." THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to George Wythe (Aug. 13, 1786), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 859.
80. MAIER, supra note 59, at 182; Ellis, supra note 67, at 19. Jefferson,
Adams, and Franklin were three of the "Committee of Five" appointed by
Congress to draft the Declaration, the other two being Roger Sherman and
Robert Livingston. Ellis, supra note 67, at 19. Sherman shared Adams's
antipathy to hereditary privileges,: writing to him that "what especially
denominates a republic is its dependence on the public or people at large,
without any hereditary powers." Letter from Roger Sherman to John Adams
(July 20, 1789) in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 437

(Charles F. Adams ed., 1851). He described the United States as a republic
"wherein [there] is no higher rank than that of common citizens, unless
distinguished by appointments to office." Id. at 438. Similarly, in his writing
urging the ratification of the Constitution he noted that the liberties of the
people of England were "not as free ... because much of their government is in
the hands of hereditary majesty and nobility." ROGER SHERMAN, Countryman
V, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1787-1788 228 (Paul L.

Ford ed. 1892) (emphasis in original).
Among the Committee of Five,
Livingston held the most pro-aristocratic views. See generally GORDON
DANGERFIELD, CHANCELLOR ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON OF NEW YORK 1746-1813
(1960). There is no evidence, however, that Livingston played any role in the
Declaration's drafting. Id. at 78-79. Indeed, so little a role did Livingston play
in preparing the document that he never mentioned his involvement in any
letter or subsequent writings and was not even present on August 2nd to vote in
favor of the Declaration. Id. at 79-80.
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or rich commons have a right to inherit the earth.""l Being a
"gentleman" was determined by personal merit and
education, not by whether one was "high-born or . . . lowborn," and the honorific was open to all (white) men
"[w]hether by birth they be descended from magistrates and
officers of government, or from husbandmen, merchants,
mechanics, or laborers... ."I2 Indeed, it is "vain and mean to
esteem oneself for his Ancestors Merit."8 3 Despite his own
later yearnings for pomp and titles,8 4 he believed that these
were earned by personal merit, not inherited.
Adams put this antipathy for inherited preference into
practice when he drafted the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, which states:
No man nor corporation or association of men have any
other title to obtain advantages, or particular and
exclusive privileges distinct from those of the community,
than what rises from the consideration of services
rendered to the public, and this title being in nature
neither hereditary nor transmissible to children or
descendants or relations by blood; the idea of a man born a
magistrate, lawgiver, or judge is absurd and unnatural.8 5
As Gordon Wood concludes, "to his dying day John Adams
was haunted by the veneration for family that existed in New

81. 1 JOHN ADAMS, PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 167-68 (Robert J. Taylor, et al.
eds., 1977).
82. WOOD, supra note 44, at 195 (quoting THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,
NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS, supra note 80, at 185).
83. Id. at 201 (quoting 1 JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN
ADAMS 207 (L.H.Butterfield et al. eds., 1961)).
84. See NELSON, supra note 57, at 204-05. Jefferson referred to Adams's
late (i.e., 1791) "apostasy to hereditary monarchy & nobility."
THOMAS
JEFFERSON, Letter to George Washington (May 8, 1791), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 977. But Adams later maintained that
he had been misunderstood, and that he merely thought that elites would
always be an important part of society because "[ilnequalities of Mind and Body
are so established by God Almighty in his constitution of Human Nature that no
Art or policy can ever plain them down to a level." ELLIS, supra note 52, at 249
(quoting Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (July 9, 1813), in 2 THE
ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS 351 (Lester G. Cappon ed.,
1959)); see generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 406, 410 (2001). As
summarized by Foner, "Adams was no less of a republican than Paine, but his
republicanism had an unmistakable elitist bias." FONER, supra note 46, at 122;
see also NELSON, supra note 57, at 96.
85. MASS. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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England."8 6
Franklin shared these views." In 1753, Franklin served
on a Pennsylvania Assembly committee that reminded the
proprietors, who controlled Pennsylvania politics at the
time,"8 that rank and position should be earned rather than
conferred by descent:
As to Rank, the Proprietaries may remember, that the
Crown has likewise been pleased to give the Assemblies of
this Province a Rank; a Rank which they hold, not by
hereditary Descent, but as they are the voluntary choice of
a free People, unbrib'd, and even unsollicited. But they are
sensible that true Respect is not necessarily connected

with Rank, and that it is only from a Course of Action
suitable to that Rank they can hope to obtain it.8 9
Franklin's views against hereditary privilege were
hardened by his close observation of Britain's House of
Lords.9 °
He mocked the "Hereditary Legislators" who
"appear'd to have scarce Discretion enough to govern a Herd
of Swine," and he believed that, "[tihere would be more
Propriety, because less Hazard of Mischief, in having [(as] in
some University of Germany,) Hereditary Professors of
Mathematicks!" 91
86. WOOD, supra note 44, at 182.
87. See WALTER ISAACSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERICAN LIFE 322
(2003) ("Franklin focused much of his writing on egalitarian, anti-elitist ideas
for building a new American society based on middle class virtues.").
88. See H.W. BRANDS, THE FIRST AMERICAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 210-12 (2000).
89. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Pennsylvania Assembly Committee: Report on the
Proprietors' Answer (Sept. 11, 1753), in 5 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

42
(Leonard
W.
Larabee
ed.,
1962),
available
at
http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/ (upon agreeing to the license, follow the
"Begin Browsing" hyperlink under the "Browsing by date" then follow "Volume
5 1753-55" hyperlink, then follow the "Pennsylvania Assembly Committee
Report on the Proprietors' Answer" hyperlink).
90. See BRANDS, supra note 88, at 488-90.
91. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, To William Franklin: Journal of the Negotiations
in London (Mar. 22, 1775), in 21 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 540
(William
B.
Wilcox
ed.,
1978),
available
at
http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklinl (upon agreeing to the license, follow the
"Begin Browsing" hyperlink under the "Browsing by date" then follow "Volume
21 1774-75" hyperlink, then follow the "To William Franklin: Journal of the
Negotiations in London" hyperlink). This statement presaged Paine's later
assertion that, "the idea of hereditary legislators is as inconsistent as that of
hereditary judges, as hereditary juries; and as absurd as a hereditary
mathematician, or an hereditary wise man; as ridiculous as an hereditary poetlaureat." THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, in COLLECTED WRITINGS 53 (Gregory
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Franklin wrote to his own daughter that,
descending Honour, to Posterity who could have had no
Share in obtaining it, is not only groundless and absurd,
but often hurtful to that Posterity, since it is apt to make
them proud.
92
He explained to the world that in America, "people do not
enquire of a stranger, What is he? but, What can he do?"93
Others who played a leading role in the adoption of the
Declaration, such as Samuel Adams, endorsed its rejection of
hereditary distinctions. Adams, like the drafters, expressly
understood the Declaration's statement of equality to
preclude "the absurd and unnatural claim of hereditary and
exclusive privileges."94
Men could not properly "exalt
themselves & their family upon the ruins of the common
liberty,"9 5 because "[t]he son of an excellent man may never
inherit the great qualities of his father."96
In short, the Declaration's assertion of equality was both
intended and widely understood to encompass a rejection of
hereditary privileges among white men.
ii. The 1787 Constitution
Multiple provisions of the 1787 Constitution memorialize

Claeys ed., Hacket Publishing 1992) (1791-1792).
92. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Letter to Sarah Bache (Jan. 26, 1784), in 9
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 162 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1906). This letter,

like Jefferson's of April 1784 to George Washington, see supra note 54, was
prompted by the controversy over the Society of the Cincinnati. Franklin
described the Society as "an Attempt to establish something like an hereditary
Rank or Nobility," which he rejected because "all descending Honours are wrong
and absurd; [and] the Honour of virtuous Actions appertains only to him that
performs them, and is in its nature incommunicable." Letter to George Whatley
(May 23, 1785), in 9 WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, supra at 336 (emphasis

in original).
93. ISAACSON, supra note 87, at 423 (stating that Ben Franklin's essay
'Information to Those Who Would Remove to America' is one of the clearest
expressions of belief that American society should be based on the virtues of the
middle (or 'mediocre,' as he sometimes called them meaning it as a word of
praise) classes, of which he still considered himself a part").
94. Larson, supra note 4, at 1406 (quoting N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, Jan. 27,
1794, at 2).
95. Puls, supra note 46, at 214 (quoting Letter to Elbridge Gerry (Apr. 19,
1784), in THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 299 (Harry Alonzo ed., 1904)).
96. Id. at 224-25 (quoting THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT
OF THE

UNITED

STATES:

WITH A

ILLUSTRATIONS, supra note 80, at 421).

LIFE OF THE

AUTHOR,

NOTES AND
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the victory against hereditary privilege. 97 To begin with,
Article IV, Section 4 provides that, "the United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government.""5
The Founders disputed the particular
meaning of "republican" in this context, with Hamilton urging
that it meant a proscription on hereditary status and
Madison asserting that it meant government by consent of
the governed.9 9 But even Madison held that consent must be
"derived from the great body of the society, not from any
inconsiderable proportion, or of a favored class of it."100 The
essential feature of a republican government was its
treatment of citizens without regard to their birth status; to
denominate a government "republican" was to distinguish it
from an aristocraticone.101
Next, Article I prohibits the national (Section 9, clause 8)
and State (Section 10, clause 1) governments from granting
any title of nobility. 102 These provisions were included in the
earliest proposals at the constitutional convention and
sparked little debate because they were entirely
uncontroversial.' 03 Professor Larson amasses a mountain of
research establishing that the title of nobility clauses were
intended to prohibit the granting of hereditary privileges by
government.10 4 He concludes that legacy preferences in public
97. On the continuities of the egalitarian nature of the Declaration and the
1787 Constitution, see FONER, supra note 46, at 205-09.
98. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
99. Brandon, supra note 44, at 1223-24.
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES AND
LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 27 (1993). Accordingly,

Brandon concludes, "in fact, as Hamilton's and Madison's contributions to The
Federalist indicate, establishing representative democracy and abolishing
hereditary status were merely two sides of the same coin; both were
fundamental principles of republican government and aimed at the same basic
goal: liberty." Brandon, supra note 44, at 1223-24.
101. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 276-78
(2005).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, § 10, cl. 1.
103. Torke, supra note 44, at 615. The Articles of Confederation had
prevented Congress from granting any title of nobility. See Articles of
Confederation, Art. VI, § 1.
104. See Larson, supra note 4, at 1375; see also Brandon, supra note 44, at
1223. Torke notes that the ban on granting titles of nobility is closely related to
the guarantee of a republican form of government because prohibiting positions
from being passed lineally keeps them available to all. Torke, supra note 44, at
615 & nn.358-60 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 85 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 39
(James Madison), No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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universities are "egregious violation[s] of the constitutional
prohibition of titles of nobility." °5
Article III, section 3, clause 2 provides that, "no
Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person Attainted."1°6
Under English and certain American state law at the time,
persons convicted of treason and other specified capital
crimes suffered a hereditary curse-they were prohibited
from passing property on to their heirs or inheriting property
from their ancestors, the property being forfeited to the
sovereign. 0 7 The Constitution prohibited these "corruption of
blood" statutes that stained a family's lineage. O' "Just as no
favorite son should be handed his sire's government post, so
no child should be punished for the sins of his father."0 9
Similarly, Article I, Sections 9 and 10 prohibit the federal
and state governments, respectively, from passing any bills of
attainder."0
Alexander Hamilton explained that these
clauses protected defined groups of citizens from legislative
disenfranchisement and banishment, because such acts could
result in an "aristocracy or an oligarchy.""' More generally,
the Attainder clauses prohibit the government from
penalizing persons based on their identity or status rather
than their conduct." 2 These provisions, together with the ban
105. Larson, supra note 4, at 1379.
106. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl.2.
107. Brandon, supra note 44, at 1217.
108. Id. at 1224; see also Hills, supra note 44, at 1601; Torke, supra note 44,
at 615.
109. AMAR, supra note 101, at 243.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
111. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-42, 444 (1965) (quoting III
John C. Hamilton, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 34
(1959)).
112. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness,
95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 215 (1996); see also Balkin, supra note 12, at 2350; Torke,
supra note 44, at 616 n.356. Numerous other provisions similarly reflect an
insistent effort to stamp out hereditary distinction, although sometimes in more
subtle ways. See Torke, supra note 44, at 615-16 (requirement of Presidential
appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate guards against "family
attachment") (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton)); Delgado,
supra note 44, at 112 (title of "President" was chosen to avoid exalted, noble
title); id. at 112 n.90 (noting preamble's reference to "We the People" and Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process to all "persons"). In THE FEDERALIST
No. 57, Madison emphasized the egalitarian nature of voting qualifications for
the House of Representatives: "Who are to be the electors of the Federal
Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than
the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the
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on titles of nobility, ensured that citizens would be "judged on
the basis of their behavior, not their birth status."" 3 When
added their
the States ratified the federal Constitution, many
4
own condemnations of hereditary privileges.1
iii. The Abolitionists and Radical Republicans
Jefferson's election in 1800 marked another milestone in
the nation's turn away from hereditary privilege."' In the
civil and economic spheres, as well as in government affairs,
the foundation of American society would be "our equal right
to the use of our own faculties, to the acquisitions of our
industry, to honor and confidence from our fellow-citizens,
humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. .

.

.

No qualification of

wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the
judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 57
(James Madison), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE
OVER RATIFICATION 213-14 (1993).
Contemporaries noted that even the

Senate, which some saw as having an aristocratic flavor, was composed
"without one distinction in favor of the birth, rank, wealth or power of the
senators or their fathers." WILENTZ, supra note 61, at 33 (quoting Independent
Gazeteer [Philadelphia], Nov. 6, 1787).
113. AMAR, supra note 101, at 125.
114. See, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 9, 1788),
http://constitution.org/rc/rat-ma.htm (statement of Rev. Backus) ("Another
great advantage, sir, in the Constitution before us, is, its excluding all titles of
nobility, or hereditary succession of power, which hath been a main engine of
tyranny in foreign countries. But the American revolution was built upon the
principle that all men are born with an equal right to liberty and property, and
that officers have no right to any power but what is fairly given them by the
consent of the people."). Following independence, the constitutions drafted by
both former colonies and new States reflected the revolutionary rejection of
hereditary privilege. See, e.g., ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY
18-19 (1960); FRANKLIN B. HOUGH, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1872); MAIER,
supra note 59, at 167; Larson, supra note 4, at 1385-86. The new States
similarly rejected hereditary punishment, as shown by provisions that enjoined
the use of bills of attainder or corruption of blood penalties. See generally Max
Stier, Note, Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of the
Parents Should Not Matter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 727, 730-31 (1992). After the
Revolution, the States also abolished the remnants of feudal land law, including
primogeniture and fee tail. See WOOD, supra note 44, at 183; Brandon, supra
note 44, at 1215-17; Delgado, supra note 44, at 111 n.78. Repealing these
hereditary land laws "laid the axe to the root of Pseudo-aristocracy." THOMAS
JEFFERSON, Letter to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 1308.
115. See KARST, supra note 1, at 36 (Jefferson's election reflected a definitive
rejection of aristocratic values); ARIELI, supra note 52, at 124 ("[E]qualitarian
democracy . . . envisioned a radical breakup of economic, social, and political
privileges.").
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resulting not from birth but from our actions and their sense
of them."116
The no-hereditary-privileges principle was
further expanded by the Jacksonians, 117 who "dismantled the
ramparts of privilege" wherever they could across the
11 8

country.

These egalitarian ideas soon made their way to the
abolitionists and Radical Republicans, who interpreted them
to demand an end to chattel slavery.'1 9 Many abolitionists
relied on the Guaranty Clause, asserting that equality is
"[t]he very pith and essence of a republican form of
116. THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 494. Of course, there have
always been dissenting voices. The Widow Douglas asserted that being "well
born" like the Grangerford aristocrats was "worth as much in a man as it is in a
horse." MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN, in MARK TWAIN:
MISSISSIPPI WRITINGS 728 (Guy Cardwell ed., 1982); see also id. at 876
(honoring "noble" things and "ancesters" "that come over from England with
William the Conqueror in the Mayflower or one of them early ships").
117. Jackson's 1832 veto message on the rechartering of the Second Bank of
the United States provided the nation with a powerful vision of equality:
In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior
industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to
protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these natural
and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities,
and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more
powerful, the humble members of society -- the farmers, mechanics,
and laborers who have neither the time nor the means of securing like
favors to themselves -- have a right to complain of the injustice of their
Government.
Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1153 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897); see generally
Balkin, supra note 12, at 2347 (Jackson's opposition to class legislation resulted
from his "distrust of governments granting monopoly charters and other special
privileges to the rich and powerful").
118. Paul D. Carrington, Legal Education for the People: Populism and Civic
Virtue, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1994); see generally William M. Gouge, The
Artificial Inequality of Wealth, in IDEOLOGY AND POWER IN THE AGE OF
JACKSON 110-21 (Edwin C. Rozwenc ed., 1964) (popular Jacksonian writer who
extolled the virtues of economic opportunity and criticized economic privilege).
The relationship between the Jacksonian democratic principles and the
constitutional vision of the Republicans of the 39th Congress is undeniable. See
Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of
Independence, the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
361, 403 (1993) (the Republicans relied on Jackson's veto message for the
concept of "equal protection").
Of course, Jackson's idea of equality
conspicuously failed to encompass African Americans, women, or Native
Americans.
See LIND, supra note 2, at 46; ROBERT V. REMINI, THE
REVOLUTIONARY AGE OF ANDREW JACKSON 17 (1976); HARRY L. WATSON,

LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA 13-14 (1990).
119. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 16-17 (1988).
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government."12 ° Others, such as Frederick Douglass, argued
that "[t]he Constitution forbids the passing of a bill of
attainder: that is, a law entailing upon the child the
disabilities and hardships imposed upon the parent. Every
slave law in America might be repealed on this very ground.
The slave is made a slave because his mother is a slave."12'
Most importantly, the pre-War Republicans asserted that
the Declaration's guiding principle of equality was always
intended to include African Americans and should be
extended to protect them. 12 2 The Declaration-which Lincoln
called "the white man's charter of freedom"123 -- ensured that
"having kicked off the King and Lords of Great Britain, we
should not at once be saddled with a King and Lords of our
own."'2 4 Lincoln and the moderates 125 expressly understood
120. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 75 (enlarged ed. 1965)
(quoting WILLIAM GOODELL, VIEWS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ITS
BEARING UPON AMERICAN SLAVERY (1844)); see also Theodore Parker, The
Relation of Slavery to a Republican Form of Government: A Speech Delivered at
the
New
England
Anti-Slavery
Convention
(May
26,
1858),
http://memorOy.loc.gov/cbi-bin/query.
121. Balkin, supra note 12, at 2350 n.113 (quoting FREDERICK DOUGLASS,

The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro or Anti-Slavery?, in 2 THE LIFE
AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS:

PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE 1850-1860

478 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950)); see generally LIND, supra note 2, at 379-83
(discussing Douglass's contribution to idea of equal rights).
122. TENBROEK, supra note 120, at 85 n.20, 118; see also MAIER, supra note

59, at 198; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 235, 249 (1994) ("Perhaps the
most important source of antislavery Republicanism was the Declaration of
Independence.").
123. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Eulogy on Henry Clay at Springfield, Missouri (July
6, 1852), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 269
(Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) [hereinafter SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1].For
Lincoln, the Declaration was "the sheet anchor of American republicanism."
Speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854), in
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS I, supra at 328. Lincoln "never had a feeling
politically that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration
of Independence."
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Speech at Independence Hall,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Feb. 22, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 213 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) [hereinafter
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS II]. As Jaffa shows, "One might epitomize everything
Lincoln said between 1854 and 1861 as a demand for recognition of the Negro's
human rights, as set forth in the Declaration of Independence." JAFFA, supra
note 51, at 290; see also JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 126 (1990); WILENTZ, supra note 61, at 737.
124. Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois (June 26,
1857), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS I, supra note 123, at 400.
125. Lincoln was squarely at the center of the Republican party. Farber &
Muench, supra note 122, at 250.
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the Declaration to proscribe hereditary disadvantage, and
they asserted that this principle should be extended to protect
African Americans.'2 6 Slavery pitted "the common right of
humanity" against "the divine right of kings":
It is the same spirit that says, "You work and toil and earn
bread, and I'll eat it." No matter in what shape it comes,
whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride
the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their
labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving
another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.1 27
The Nation had been "dedicated to the proposition that
all men are created equal," and in extending the nohereditary-privilege principle to the children of African
the War brought to the Nation "a new birth
American slaves,
128
of freedom."

126. Lincoln asserted that the Founders intended to include the slaves
among the "all men" referred to in the Declaration-declaring their right to be
equal, and leaving the enforcement of that right to follow as soon as it became
politically feasible. See JAFFA, supra note 51, at 21, 300, 352-53.
127. Seventh Lincoln-Douglas Debate, at Alton, Illinois (Oct. 15, 1858), in
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS I, supra note 123, at 811; see also Response to
Serenade, Washington, D.C. (July 7, 1863), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS II,
supra note 123, at 476 ("[A]t the bottom of [the Rebellion] is an effort to
overthrow the principle that all men were created equal."). Benjamin Wade had
made the same point in the Senate in 1854, arguing that the Declaration was
incompatible with slavery because the assertion of a right of one man to control
another was equivalent to "the divine right of every king, and every emperor,
and every monarch, to reign over his subjects, and the right of privileged orders
everywhere." CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. app. 311 (1854). To assert
such a right was to contradict the "principle [that] was established by the
American Revolution." Id. at app. 310; see generally MAIER, supra note 59, at
Opponents such as Alexander Stephens asserted that the
200-04.
Confederate's new government was "founded upon exactly the opposite idea...
its cornerstone rests upon the great truth that the Negro is not equal to the
white man." JAFFA, supra note 51, at 222 (quoting The Cornerstone Speech
(March 21, 1861), in ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WITH
LETTERS AND SPEECHES 721-22 (1866)); see also EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE
WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE 123 (1969) (in the South, "[t]he Declaration

of Independence and Lockeian political philosophy came under heavy attack").
Lincoln hated slavery "especially because it forces so many really good men
amongst ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of
Speech on the
civil liberty--criticizing the Declaration of Independence."
Kansas-Nebraska Act at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854), in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS I, supra note 123, at 315.
128. Lincoln's critics immediately recognized the significance of the
Gettysburg Address in confirming the centrality of the Declaration's principle of
equality and its extension to encompass blacks. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD,
LINCOLN 465-66 (1995).
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b.

Congress Codified and Extended the
Declaration'sPrinciple.
The debates reveal that Congress intended the 1866 Act
to codify the Declaration's no-hereditary-privilege principle
and extend it to encompass African Americans.12 9 Senator
Trumbull of Illinois, the author of the Act, noted that the
Declaration and the Constitution's egalitarian provisions had
set forth the principle that all men are created equal. 130 But
the mere statement of principle had failed to protect
oppressed whites or millions of African Americans, so it was
"the intention of this bill to secure those rights. '1 3 1 The
principle of equality among white men had been the
cornerstone of the founding of the republic; the 1866 Act
would codify and extend that principle, and thus create a new
132
foundation for the reborn nation.
The debates overflow with references to the fact that
Congress intended the 1866 Act to embody and give effect to

129. Upon being elected Speaker of the House, Schuyler Colfax asserted that

the goal of the 39th Congress would be to enact legislation that would "afford
what our Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the chief
object of government-protection to all men in their inalienable rights." CONG.

GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1157 (1865) (Rep. Colfax); see also Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary ConstitutionalismIn the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 863, 893-94 (1986) (discussing Colfax's
speech). Northern newspapers urged Congress to propose an amendment that
would embody the Declaration's principle and thereby prohibit any "privileged
class." NELSON, supra note 57, at 76.
130. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 434 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull).
131. Id. (1866 Act was intended to protect the civil rights that had been
"intended to be secured by the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution of the United States originally"). Senator Sumner asserted that
the greatest victory of the Civil War was that "the Declaration of Independence
is made a living letter instead of a promise." DAVID DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER
AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 423 (1970) [hereinafter DONALD, SUMNER II] (quoting
XIII CHARLES SUMNER, THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 175-78 (2008)).

132. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1262 (1866) (Rep.
Broomall) ("[I]t is . . . well that a return to the principles of the founders of the
Government should be made manifest to future generations by a declaration
upon the statute-books."); id. at 1157 (Rep. Windom) ("A true republic rests
upon the absolute equality of rights of the whole people, high and low, rich and
poor, white and black. Upon this the only foundation which can permanently
endure, we professed to build our republic; but at the same time we not only
denied to a large portion of the people equality of rights, but we robbed them of
every right known to human nature."). The Thirteenth Amendment had also
been inspired in large part by the Declaration. See Farber & Muench, supra
note 122, at 257 (detailing the invocation of the Declaration in 13th Amendment
debates).
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the Declaration's principle. 133 The planter aristocracy's
domination of blacks and poor whites was impermissible
because "we have accepted the sublime truths of the
Declaration of Independence. We stand as the champions of
human rights for all men, black and white, the wide world
over, and we mean that just and equal laws shall pervade
every rood of this nation. ' 134 The Act was "one of those
measures that are absolutely necessary to carry into effect
the decisions of the late war" by "carry[ing] into effect the
135
doctrine of the Declaration."
After the extensive debates on the 1866 Act, references to
the Declaration as a source for the Equal Protection
Guarantee became routine. 3 6 In a typical statement, Senator
133. See Reinstein, supra note 118, at 388-89 ("[Tlhe consistency of the
references to and reliance upon the Declaration in relation to the Civil Rights
Act and Section 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is remarkable."). Senator
Sumner, the Republicans' intellectual leader on the issue of equality, had early
articulated the idea that all distinctions based on birth-whether advocated by
the slavocrats or the Know-Nothings-were precluded by "[tihe emphatic words
of the Declaration of Independence, which our country took upon its lips as
baptismal vows."
Charles Sumner, Speech: The Slave Oligarchy and Its
Usurpations
3
(Nov.
2,
1855)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.archive.org/details/slaveoligarchyanOOsumnrich)
[hereinafter
Sumner, The Slave Oligarchy]; see generally DAVID DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER
AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 153 (1961) [hereinafter DONALD, SUMNER
I] (throughout his career "Sumner was to echo [John Q.] Adam's doctrines that
the Declaration of Independence, with its pledge of universal human equality,
was as much a part of the public law of the land as the Constitution"); DONALD,
SUMNER II, supra note 131, at 208 (when Lincoln "said he never had an idea,
politically, that did not spring from the Declaration, he used words which
Sumner could have echoed").
134. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 344 (1866) (Sen. Wilson); id. at 1157
(Rep. Windom) ("[Tihis, I believe, is one of the first efforts made since the
formation of the Government to give practical effect to the principles of the
Declaration of Independence; one of the first attempts to grasp as a vital reality
and embody in the forms of law the great truth that all men are created
equal."); id. at 1117 (Rep. Wilson) ("We are reducing to statute form the spirit of
the Constitution."); id. at 571 (Sen. Morrill) (Declaration prohibits "any other
distinction than that of condition").
135. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. 547 (Rep. Prosser) (debate on
Enforcement Act of 1870); see infra text accompanying note 232.
136. Advocates believed that the Guarantee was "almost entirely declaratory
of the great natural rights of men already embodied in the Declaration of
Independence, lying at the foundations of all Republican governments, and
expressed in the Constitution itself." TENBROEK, supra note 120, at 232; see
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (Rep. Stevens) ("Our fathers
have been compelled to postpone the principles of their great Declaration, and
wait for their full establishment till a more propitious time. That time ought to
be present now."); id. at 2510 (Rep. Miller) ("[Tihe equal protection guarantee is
so clearly within the spirit of the Declaration of Independence of the 4th of July,
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Poland asserted that the Guarantee "is essentially declared in
the Declaration of Independence and in all the provisions of
the Constitution. . . . It certainly seems desirable that no
doubt should be left existing as to the power of Congress to
enforce principles lying at the very foundation of all
137
republican government."
The Guarantee was authored by Representative John
Bingham of Ohio, who invoked the biblical prescriptions that
God "hath made of one blood all nations of men" and is "no
respecter of persons," and asserted that the Declaration was
"a reiteration of the[se] great truth[s] ."13 Bingham argued
that the Guarantee confirmed the protections that the
Declaration and the Constitution had secured for whites and
extended those protections to African Americans: "the
divinest feature of your Constitution is the recognition of the
absolute equality before the law of all persons, . . . subject
only to the exception made by reason of slavery, now happily
abolished." 13 ' By ratifying the Amendment, the American
people would "declare their purpose to stand by the
foundation principle of their own institutions." 4 '
The public likewise understood the Guarantee as
1776, that no member of this House can seriously object to it."); id. at 2539 (Rep.
Farnsworth) ("Is not [equal protection] the very foundation of a republican
government?"); id. at 3037 (Sen. Yates) ("I would write in the fundamental and
unchangeable law of the land, that the Declaration . . . was a verity."); id. at
3032 (Sen. Henderson) ("In forming his opinion in [Dred Scott, Justice Taney]
abandoned the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence."); id. at app.
256 (Rep. Baker) ("[The equal protection guarantee appeals irresistibly to the
democratic instinct of the people, and it will be a jewel of beauty when placed in
the Constitution of the country.").
137. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (Sen. Poland).
138. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639 (1862) (Rep. Bingham)
(referring, in debate on slavery in District of Columbia, to Acts of the Apostles
17:26 and 10:34); see generally ERVING BEAUREGARD, BINGHAM OF THE HILLS
95-96, 97, 108 (1989) (tracing Bingham's reverence for Declaration to
presbyterian minister's class on American history).
139. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (Rep. Bingham).
140. Id. at 432 (Rep. Bingham); accordid. at 429, 431 (Rep. Bingham). When
later explaining the meaning of the Guarantee, Bingham again invoked the
Declaration. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 86 (1871) (Rep. Bingham).
Most Republicans believed that Congress had constitutional authority to pass
the 1866 Act before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment because "equality
of civil rights is the fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866) (Rep. Lawrence). Bingham agreed
that equality was the foundation of the Constitution, but thought Congress
lacked authority to pass the Act until the Amendment was ratified. Id. at
1291-92 (Rep. Bingham).
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codifying and extending to African Americans the Founders'
republican principles and, in particular, the Declaration's ban
on "untitled nobles."
2. The 39th Congress Codified the PrincipleAgainst
HereditaryDistinctions in Order to Suppress
Southern Aristocracy.
Republicans believed that the North's fundamental moral
and economic precepts were threatened not (only) by slavery,
but, more broadly, by a southern aristocratic society founded
on lineage and status. Having won the war, the Republicans
of the 39th Congress codified the no-hereditary-distinction
principle in order to suppress the southern aristocracy.

141. See, e.g., Scrapbook on the Fourteenth Amendment 20 (E. McPherson
ed.), in Edward McPherson Papers, container 100 (collection available in
Library of Congress) [hereinafter Scrapbook on Fourteenth Amendment]
(National Anti-Slavery Standard July 22, 1865) (Guarantee will "[r]efuse to the
States what we have always refused to the Nation-the right to maintain an
order of untitled nobles: to breed up one class booted and spurred, and another
saddled and bridled for the first class to ride"); id. at 61 (Hartford Daily
Courant) ("What the American people want is a fair start in life for every
American citizen. . . . [Winning the war] meant that Slavery, with all its
abominable distinctions of class, its aristocracy of caste, its undemocratic
depreciation of the laborer, should be forever annihilated."). "Madison" wrote a
series of articles characterizing both universal manhood suffrage and equal civil
rights as natural extensions of the Founders' republican principles. See id. at
47 (New York Times, Nov. 23, 1866) (national citizenship and its guarantee of
equal civil rights is extension of elimination of "old fallacies" such as "real estate
qualifications" and "primogeniture and other aristocratic notions"); id. at 56
(unidentified newspaper) (the nation "will never be complete, as a great
Republic, until it clearly defines citizenship and protects every man entitled to
the name of American citizen ... ."). The public had understood the 1866 Act to
be aimed at the same goals. See, e.g., Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill 37 (E.
McPherson ed.), in Edward McPherson Papers, container 99 (collection
available in Library of Congress) [hereinafter Scrapbook on the Civil Rights
Bill] (Rochester [N.Y.] Democrat) (Act "effect[s] that equality of all men before
the law which the theory of our Government declares, but which has never yet
been carried out"); id. at 56 (Boston Journal) (Act's purpose "is to secure the
equality of American citizenship, to realize for the first time the fundamental
doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, and carry out the avowed
purposes of the Constitution"); id. at 54 (Rochester Express) (Act is "entirely in
accordance with republican ideas"); Letter from George A. Hackett to Lyman
Trumbull (April 26, 1866), collected in 65 Lyman Trumbull Papers (collection
available in the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) ("The Declaration of
Independence was received by the American People with no greater pleasure
than the Civil Rights Bill by the Colored Population of the United States.").
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The Republicans Believed That Southern
Aristocracy Threatened the Nation.

In asserting that the "irrepressible conflict" was between
a "republic or democracy" in the North and a "ruling
aristocracy" in the South, Senator Seward was voicing a
prevailing northern view. 14 ' Southerners agreed that the War
was a clash between a society founded on the proposition
"that all men are equal and that equality is right," thus
forming a "horizontal plane of a democracy," and another
society contending that "all men are not equal, that equality
is not right," and thus forming "a social aristocracy. "143
The Republicans believed that the immediate victims of
southern aristocracy were not only slaves, but also nonslaveholding whites."'
Slaveholders and their families
constituted only about twenty-five percent of free southerners
but owned ninety-three percent of the South's agricultural
wealth.'4 5 They had fourteen times the average wealth of
non-slaveholding whites. 4 ' This wealth was highly
concentrated in only some ten thousand families, 4 ' and poor
whites had no hope of ever joining the slaveholding
aristocracy.148 Northern newspapers noted that, "fortunes are
1 49
frequently inherited in the South-they are rarely made."
142. See WILLIAM SEWARD, On the Irrepressible Conflict, in IX THE WORLD'S
FAMOUS ORATIONS 177-85 (Wm.
J. Bryan ed., 1906); see also DONALD, supra
note 128, at 460; ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 50, 65, 70
(1995); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY 297 (2d
ed. 1989).
143. WILENTZ, supra note 61, at 745 (quoting L.W. Spratt, "Report On The
Slave Trade," 24 DEBOW'S REV. 473-74 (1858)); see also id. at 773, 775; ARIELI,
supra note 52, at 206, 299; ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE & EUGENE D. GENOVESE,
THE MIND OF THE MASTER CLASS 114-15 (2005). George Fitzhugh asserted
that, "We have an aristocracy with more of privilege.., than any that we meet
with in history."
GENOVESE, supra note 127, at 189 (quoting GEORGE
FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH: OR, THE FAILURE OF FREE SOCIETY 186
(1854)).
144. FONER, supra note 142, at 46-47, 64-69, 88; WILENTZ, supra note 61, at
615.

145. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum
Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 224 n.6 (1999).
146. Id.

147. Id.
148. FONER, supra note 142, at 48. A greater percentage of free blacks in
Massachusetts attended school than did whites in South Carolina. DONALD,
SUMNER I, supra note 133, at 355.
149. FONER, supra note 142, at 48, (quoting CINCINNATI GAZETTE, July 31,
1856).
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Republicans also saw southern aristocracy as a threat to
the democratic institutions of the North. The slavocrats had
managed to ban antislavery publications from the southern
mails, impose the congressional "Gag Rule" (preventing
citizens from petitioning the House to abolish slavery), pass
the Fugitive Slave Act, and pressure northern States to
punish abolitionist persuasion as seditious libel. 150 And the
Dred Scott decision threatened to extend slavery throughout
51
the North by judicial fiat.
With the coming of war, therefore, the clarion call in the
North was to end southern aristocracy.1 2 For example,
Lincoln exhorted in 1859:
[Ilt is now no child's play to save the principles of
Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation....
53
One dashingly calls them 'glittering generalities;1
54
another bluntly calls them 'self-evident lies;" and still
others insidiously argue that they apply only to 'superior
races.'
These expressions, differing in form, are identical in object
and effect-the supplanting [of] the principles of free
government, and restoring those of classification, caste,
and legitimacy.... They are the van-guard-the miners,
and sappers-of returning despotism. We must repulse

150. Garrett Epps, The Antebellum Political Background of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 67 SUM. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 191-92 (2004); see also
GARRETT EPPs, DEMOCRACY REBORN 51-52 (2006) [hereinafter EPPS,
DEMOCRACY REBORN]; LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER, 127-28

(2000); Farber & Muench, supra note 122, at 238.
151. Epps, supra note 150, at 196-97; RICHARDS, supra note 150, at 13-14.
152. See, e.g., ARIELI, supra note 52, at 309; EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN,
supra note 150, at 67; FONER, supra note 142, at 309; RICHARDS, supra note

150, at 160; WILENTZ, supra note 61, at 673; Kaczorowski, supra note 129, at
881.
153. Rufus Choate had urged former Whigs not to join the new Republican
party because the South would perceive it as a party whose "mission [was] to
inaugurate freedom and put down oligarchy, its constitution the glittering and
sounding generalities of the Declaration of Independence." BECKER, supra note
53, at 244 (quoting letter from Choate to E. W. Farley (Aug. 9, 1856), in S. G.
Brown, LIFE OF RUFUS CHOATE 325-26 (1881)).
154. Arguing in support of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Senator Pettit called
the Declaration "a self evident lie." CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 137
(1854). Lincoln said that if Pettit had uttered those words in Independence Hall
in 1776, "the very door-keeper would have throttled [him]." Speech on the
Kansas-Nebraska Act at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854), in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS I, supra note 123, at 339.
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1 55
them, or they will subjugate us.
As summarized by Lincoln, the North fought in order to
"lift artificial weights from all shoulders-to clear the paths of
laudable pursuit for all-to afford all, an unfettered start, and
a fair chance, in the race of life."156

b.

Congress Intended the 1866 Act and the
Guarantee to Suppress Southern Aristocracy.

The debates reveal Congress's intent to embody in
positive law the anti-aristocracy views that had animated the
Republicans before the War. As seen from the debates on the
Thirteenth Amendment, the 1866 Act, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and other Reconstruction legislation that was
considered by the 39th Congress,15 7 references to suppressing
aristocracy are ubiquitous.
The Republicans' intellectual leader on the issue of
equality, Senator Sumner, was a long-time and incisive critic
of southern aristocracy. 158 His speech on February 5 and 6,
1866,159 invoked the anti-hereditary-privilege principle of the
Founders as the basis to suppress the southern aristocracy.
155. Letter to Henry L. Pierce and Others (Apr. 6, 1859), in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS II, supra note 123, at 18-19; see generally WILENTZ, supra note 61, at
793 (noting that "Lincoln did repulse them, and saved Jefferson's principles as
he saw them-though at the cost of more than six hundred thousand American

lives").
156. Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS II, supra note 123, at 259.
157. As summarized by Epps, "the 'lords of the lash' had been refuted by the
egalitarian armies of the North, made up of laborers-the men southerners had
scorned as 'mud-sills of society' and former slaves.
They had humbled
aristocrats like Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee. The equality genie was out
of the bottle." EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 150, at 108-09. As to
aristocracy and the Thirteenth Amendment, see CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1202 (1864) (Sen. Wilson); id. at 2989 (Rep. Ingersoll); id. at 2948-49
(Rep. Shannon); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1865) (Rep. Ashley).
158. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 574, 601 (1866) (Sen.
Hendricks) (1866 Act responds to Sumner's call for equality under law);
DONALD, SUMNER II, supra note 131, at 152-61 (discussing Sumner's leadership
on issues of equality); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 141
(1950) ("[Ihe fundamental working legal theory of equality before the law, or
equal rights, or equal protection was formulated for American law by Sumner,
and popularized under his leadership.").
159. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 673-87 (1866) (Sen. Sumner). This
was days after the Senate had passed the 1866 Act, but before the House had
acted; after House modifications, the Senate passed the revised bill on March
15, 1866 and subsequently overrode President Johnson's veto on April 6, 1866.
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Proposing that "there shall be no Oligarchy, Aristocracy,
Caste, or Monopoly invested with peculiar privileges and
16 1
powers,"16 ° he quoted the Founders:
* Benjamin Franklin-"that every man of the
commonalty, except infants, insane persons, and
criminals, is of common right, and by the laws of God,
a freeman and entitled to the free enjoyment of
162
liberty."
* James Madison[I]t is essential for such a government that it be
derived from the great body of the society, not
from an inconsiderable proportion, OR A
FAVORED CLASS OF IT; otherwise a handful of
tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions
by delegation of their powers, might aspire to the
rank of republicans, and claim for the
government the honorable title of republic. 63
• Alexander Hamilton-"there can be no truer principle
than this, that every individual of the community has
an equal right to the protection of government.... we
propose a free government. Can it be so, if partial
1 64
distinctions are made?"
" Roger Sherman-"what especially denominates it a
republic is its dependence on the public, or people at
large, without any hereditary powers."165
The nation was founded, "not to create an oligarchy or
aristocracy, not to exclude certain persons from the pale of its
privileges," but "to establish justice, which is Equality." 6 6
Sumner defined aristocracy as "the enjoyment of privileges
which are not communicable to other citizens simply by
160. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 674 (1866) (Sen. Sumner). Sumner

believed that the Revolution had been a war of democracy against aristocracy,
and that the same contest had been continued in the Civil War. DONALD,
SUMNER I, supra note 133, at 229-30.
161. All italics and capitalization were supplied by Sumner. Senator Sumner
occasionally spoke as if the entire white southern population constituted an
aristocracy founded solely on race. He just as often made clear, however, that
an elite subset of southern whites constituted an aristocracy that oppressed
non-slaveholding whites as well as blacks. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
1st Sess. 50, 167 (1867) (Sen. Sumner).
162. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 680 (1866) (Sen. Sumner).
163. Id. at 681.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 680.
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anything they can themselves do to obtain them,"167 and he
asserted that the 1866 Act prohibited it. 6 '
These were not unique views. 169 Senator Fessenden of
Maine, a moderate Republican, echoed the prevailing view of
the 1866 Act when he asserted that "I agree with the Senator
from Massachusetts, that a caste exclusion is entirely
contrary to the spirit of our Government, or of any republican
form of government." 7 ° Senator Henderson, of Missouri,
added that adoption of the 1866 Act was "a simple act of
justice to the negroes and poorer whites of the South,"
designed to "break down in the seceded States the system of
oppression to which I have alluded."' 7 '
Bingham had repeatedly invoked the Founders' principle
167. Id. at 683 (emphasis Sumner's). Sumner's views had been foreshadowed
by his legal argument in Roberts v. Boston in 1849 in which he argued that
"separate but equal" schools were inherently unequal. See Frank & Munro,
supra note 158, at 136. Relying on Massachusetts's constitutional provision
that "all men are born free and equal," Sumner contended that, regardless of
lineage, each person "is a MAN, the equal of all his fellow-men." Id. at 137 n.29
(quoting 2 CHARLES SUMNER, WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 341-42 (1875)); see

also DONALD, SUMNER I, supra note 133, at 180; EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN,
supra note 150, at 68.
168. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 684 (1866) (Sen. Sumner).
169. Senator Nye, of Nevada, likewise had seen the War as "a battle between
the opposing principles of aristocracy on the one hand and democracy on the
other." Id. at 1069 (Sen. Nye). The Founders had "thr[own] aside the
postulates of aristocracy" and had "started with a new doctrine and a new
theory." Id. at 1074. The Constitution forbade the slaveholders' attempt "to go
back to the feudal system," id. at 1070, because "[iut interdicts the granting of
any title of nobility" and proscribes "the establishment of any anti-republican
government through privileged class," id. at 1072.
170. Id. at 704 (Sen. Fessenden).
171. Id. at 3034 (Sen. Henderson); see also id. at 343 (Sen. Wilson) ("[T]he
poorest man, be he black or white, that treads the soil of this continent, is as
much entitled to the protection of the law as the richest and the proudest man
in the land."); id. at 1118 (Rep. Wilson) (Act "protect[s] ...our citizens from the
highest to the lowest"); id. at 1629 (Rep. Hart) (purpose of Act was "to guaranty
that they have [a republican form of government] speedily"); id. at 1836-37
(Rep. Lawrence) (a State that denies the rights secured by the Act to half its
citizens "has ceased to be republican in form"); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. app. 548 (1870) (Rep. Prosser) (debate on Enforcement Act of 1870)
(Democrats had "been laboring to build up an oligarchy in the North, and an
aristocracy in the South"); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom:A Legal
History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (1974) (to
drafters of 1866 Act, "slavery constituted class prejudice writ large"); Scrapbook
on the Civil Rights Bill, supra note 141, at 47 (Evening Bulletin Mar. 30, 1866)
(Act protects "the lately emancipated race, as well as . . .the oppressed white
class at the South"); id. at 79 (American And Gazette Apr. 7, 1866) (Act
"prevent[s] the southern oligarchy" from perpetuating "caste bondage").
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that merit, not hereditary privilege, would govern in this
country. 172 The Constitution's inherent principle of equality
"makes no distinction either on account of complexion or
birth."7
And the Constitution prohibits titles of nobility
because "all are equal under the Constitution; and . . . no
distinctions should be tolerated, except those which merit
originates, and no nobility except that which springs from
[talent and merit]. "
In the debate on the Guarantee,
Bingham summarized the principle against hereditary
distinctions, and universalized it, by asserting that the law
"should be no respecter of persons." 175 The debates are
replete with statements to the same effect. 76
172. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 140 (1857) (Rep.

Bingham) (debate on Lecompton constitution).
173. Id. (emphasis added).

Bingham revered the Massachusetts law that

granted the franchise to all men "in no wise dependent upon complexion or the
accident of birth," CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639 (1862) (Rep.
Bingham), and the Northwest Ordinance that protected "all the inhabitants
without respect to complexion or birth," CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 265
(1863) (Rep. Bingham).
174. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 140 (1857) (Rep. Bingham).
Bingham and all Republican representatives who voted against the admission of
Oregon, did so in part because the exclusion of free negroes from that State "is
not republican in its spirit, but, on the contrary, is oligarchical and aristocratic."
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 948 (1859); id. at 985 (Rep. Bingham) ("[Aill
men are sacred, whether white or black, rich or poor, strong or weak."); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1858) (Rep. Bingham) (decrying the
"despotism or an oligarchy fastened upon the people by brute force"); CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 256 (1863) (Rep. Bingham) (South had erected "the
meanest aristocracy and the most oppressive despotism upon the face of the
earth"); REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong.,

1st Sess., at xiii (1866) ("Slavery, by building up a ruling and dominant class,
has produced a spirit of oligarchy adverse to republican institutions.").
175. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866) (Rep. Bingham); see
also id. at 1094 (Rep. Bingham) (Guarantee protects every person "no matter
what his color, no matter beneath what sky he may have been born, . . . no

matter how poor, no matter how friendless, no matter how ignorant"); id. at 158
(Rep. Bingham) (Amendment requires States to "respect the rights of the
humblest citizen"); see generally Garrett Epps, Second Founding: The Story of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 85 OR. L. REV. 895, 905 (2006) (Bingham was
driven by the "idea of a republic, which is not governed by an elite, but is
radically egalitarian").
176. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (Sen. Howard)
(Guarantee protects "the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race");
id. at 832 (Sen. Clark) ("[Tihe Government [is] of all men, and for all men and
all classes of men. It is its crowning glory that no citizen or person living under
it is . . . so low that its protection cannot reach him."); id. at 1065 (Rep. Hale)
(Guarantee "protect[s] the liberty of the citizen -- the humblest as well as the
highest"); id. at app. 256 (Rep. Baker) ("Is it not a disgrace to a free country
that the poor and the weak members of society should be denied equal justice
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3. The 39th Congress Codified the PrincipleAgainst
HereditaryDistinctions in Order to Ensure Economic
and Social Mobility.
The Republicans' Free Labor ideology contended that
workers could rise through society and become substantial
property owners by securing the fruits of their labor. The
debates establish that the 39th Congress intended the 1866
Act and the Guarantee to safeguard this economic and social
mobility.
a.

FreeLabor Was a Driving Force in the
Republicans'Pre-WarIdeology.

Free Labor ideology was premised on the idea of social
mobility-that "all Americans, whatever their origins, could
achieve social advancement if given equal protection of the
law."177 For Lincoln and the moderate Republicans, economic
and social mobility was "the great principle for which this
government was really formed."17
Lincoln's opposition to
slavery was an extension of Free Labor ideology applicable to
all men: "I want every man to have the chance--and I believe
and equal protection at the hands of the law?"); id. at 3035 (Sen. Henderson) ("It
is only where political power is in the hands of a favored few that oppression
can be practiced."); Scrapbook on Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 141, at 20
(National Anti-Slavery Standard July 22, 1866) (Guarantee prevents States
from "maintain[ing] a system of Aristocratic Caste") (emphasis in original); id.
at 61 (Hartford Daily Courant) (Guarantee prohibits an "aristocracy of caste").
The Amendment's adversaries acknowledged this protection. See, e.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3214 (1866) (Rep. Niblack) (Guarantee protects
"all human beings, however low in the scale of humanity").
177. FONER, supra note 142, at 300; see also William E. Forbath, Caste, Class
and Equal Citizenship, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN LIFE 167, 172 (Karen
Haltunnen & Lewis Perry eds., 1998) ("[D]efending white free labor always had
loomed large in the Republicans' antislavery outlook."); Stanley N. Katz, The
Strange Birth and Unlikely History of Constitutional Equality, 75 J. AMER.
HIST. 747, 753 (1988) (Republican ideology was based on the meritocratic ideas

of "equal opportunity and social mobility"); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor
Vision Of the ThirteenthAmendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 459 (1989) ("[Flree

labor meant not just upward mobility of a few workers, but the leveling of class
differentials between laborer and employer.").
178. Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio (Sept. 17, 1859), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
II, supra note 123, at 85. This was a recurring theme in Lincoln's speeches.
See, e.g., Speech at Kalamazoo, Michigan (Aug. 27, 1856), in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS I, supra note 123, at 380; Address at Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Sept. 30,

1859), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS II, supra note 123, at 98; Speech at New
Haven, Connecticut, March 6, 1860, in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS II, supra note
123, at 144; Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1861), in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS II, supra note 123, at 297.
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a black man is entitled to it-in which he can better his
condition."179 Fundamentally, a slave was someone who, on
the illegitimate basis of heredity, had been denied the
opportunity that
labor provides for economic and social
180
advancement.
The southern intelligentsia, of course, rejected the idea
that labor should lead to social mobility, asserting that "in all
social systems, there must be a class to do the menial duties..
. . It constitutes the very mudsill of society."' The more
extreme southern newspapers declared that "[tihe principle of
Slavery is in itself right, and does not depend on difference of
complexion,"182 and that, "Slavery is the natural and normal
condition of the laboring man, whether white or black."8 3
These southerners urged the North to return to the safety of
hierarchy and status."M
179. Speech at New Haven, Connecticut, March 6, 1860, in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS II, supra note 123, at 144.
180. FONER, supra note 142, at xxvi. The Republicans also believed that the
opportunity for social advancement was the essential difference between
Northern society and class-stratified Europe. Id. at 16.
181. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1858) (Sen. Hammond) (the
"Cotton is King" speech).
182. Charles Sumner, The Barbarism of Slavery (June 4, 1860), in CONG.
GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 2601 (Sen. Sumner) (quoting RICHMOND
ENQUIRER, Dec. 15, 1855); see generally GENOVESE, supra note 127, at 100, 118
("The paternalism at the core of the slaveholders' ideology . . . extended itself
outward to encompass the white lower classes," and "[t]he proslavery argument
moved from . . . a focus on racial caste to a focus on social class."). As early as
1856, Lincoln declared that the "sentiment in favor of white slavery now
prevailed in all the slave state papers, except those of Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Missouri and Maryland." Speech at Bloomington, Illinois (May 29, 1856), in
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS I, supra note 123, at 365; see also Portion of Speech at
Republican Banquet in Chicago, Illinois (Dec. 10, 1856), in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS I, supra note 123, at 386 (Democrats' view is "that slavery is right, in
the abstract" and they promoted "its extension to all countries and colors").
Lincoln mocked the argument that slavery was an affirmative good, noting that
"it is the only good thing which no man ever seeks the good of, for himself" On
Pro-Slavery Theology (Oct. 7, 1858), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS I, supra note
123, at 686.
183. Sumner, supra note 182, at 2601-02 (quoting Charleston Mercury).
These views caused obvious alarm in the North, where the Republican party
printed a pamphlet entitled, "The New 'Democratic' Doctrine. Slavery not to be
Confined to the Negro Race, but to be made the Universal Condition of the
Laboring Classes of Society."
See ARIELI, supra note 52, at 426 n.58.
Representative Bingham warned in 1857 that the southern slaveholders were
"not likely to be restrained from inflicting like cruelties and oppressions upon
the white race." CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 135-36 (1857) (Rep.
Bingham).
184. ARIELI, supra note 52, at 305; see generally FOX-GENOVESE &
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b.

CongressIntended to SafeguardEconomic and
Social Mobility.
Congress's intent to ensure social mobility by protecting
free labor is reflected in the substantive rights that the 1866
Act secures. Under Free Labor ideology, the right to contract,
sue, give testimony, and inherit property were the legal rights
necessary for a worker to accumulate and protect the
property that his labor earned.l"' The Republicans were well
aware of the southern doctrine that, "Slavery is the natural
and normal condition of the laboring man, whether white or
black," ' 8 7 and an essential purpose of the 1866 Act was to
bury it.1

For the Republicans, the freedman belonged not only to
an oppressed race but also to "a poor, weak class of
laborers."'
The right to make and enforce contracts would
secure for laborers "the means of holding and enjoying the
proceeds of their toil."" 9 A laborer is entitled "to that which
will make him a man-opportunity."' 90 And the 1866 Act's
protections were needed by white as well as black laborers
because "the man who is the enemy of the black laboring man
is the enemy of the white laboring man the world over. The
same influences that go to keep down and crush down the
GENOVESE, supra note 143, at 704-05 (discussing Fitzhugh's view that "the
rejection of the divine right of kings constituted the worst of the political
heresies of the Reformation").
185. FONER, supra note 142, at 296 (these are the rights necessary "to
participate as a free laborer in the marketplace"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 41 (1865) (Sen. Sherman) ("To say that a man is a freeman and yet is not
able to assert and maintain his right, in a court of justice, is a negation of
terms.").
186. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (Rep. Wilson);
id. at 2955 (Rep. Kellog); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1866 (1865) (Rep.
Bingham); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 170 (1858) (Sen. Wilson).
187. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1865) (Sen. Sherman)
(people are not free without "the right to acquire and hold property, to enjoy the
fruits of their own labor"); id. at 111 (Sen. Wilson) (practical freedom requires
that man "can go where he pleases, work when and for whom he pleases"); id. at
1833 (Rep. Lawrence) ("It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a right to
live, and yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege and
the rewards of labor."); Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, supra note 141, at 62
(Baltimore American April 3, 1866) ("No king or potentate [builds up society] . .
• . [N]o caste in society does it; but the men and women who toil do it.")
(emphasis in original).
188. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866) (Rep. Windom).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 589 (Rep. Donnelly); see also id. (purpose of Act was to "offer equal
opportunities to all men").
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rights of the poor black man bear down and oppress the poor
white laboring man."191
The same concerns are reflected in the Guarantee.
Bingham had rejected nobility based on birth because "the
ONLY nobility which our free Constitution tolerates" is that
based on "patient, humble toil," the "sturdy arm of intelligent
industry," and "that imperial exercise of the intellect which
enlarges the measure of knowledge and lessens the evils of
life."192 For Bingham, "[t]he equality of all . . . to work and
enjoy the product of their toil, is the rock on which [the]
Constitution rests-its sure foundation and defense. 1 93
Thaddeus Stevens summarized, asserting that the Guarantee
ensured that "no distinction would be tolerated in this
purified Republic but what arose from merit and conduct."' 94
4. The 39th Congress Codified the Anti-Heredity
Principleby Extending the Same Rights to "All
Persons."
The debates also show that the Republicans achieved
their three-fold goal-to codify and extend the Declaration's
principle against hereditary distinctions, suppress southern
aristocracy, and promote social mobility-with deceptively
simple language. The 1866 Act extended its substantive
rights, including the right to make contracts, to "citizens,"
191. Id. at 343 (Sen. Wilson); see also id. at 1621 (Rep. Myers) (condemning
the "aristocratic and anti-republican laws" of Alabama, which imposed a fine
and six months of imprisonment for "any servant or laborer (white or black) who
loiters away his time or is stubborn or refractory").
192. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 140 (1857) (Rep. Bingham)
(debate on Lecompton constitution) (emphasis in original).
193. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859) (Rep. Bingham) (debate
on admission of Oregon). Bingham ridiculed the slaveholders' contention that
free laborers "were but greasy mechanics and menial operatives, the 'mud-sills'
of society, unfit to associate with gentlemen." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d
Sess. 266 (1863) (Rep. Bingham); see also BEAUREGARD, supra note 138, at 75
(Bingham's stump speeches praised "the rough fisted farmer and the greasy
mechanic").
194. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (Rep. Stevens); see also
id. at app. 58 (Rep. Julian) (southern "pride and sloth" will be doomed when it
comes into "conflict with the energy and enterprise of free labor"); id. at 2964
(Sen. Poland) (South would be "opened up and expanded by the influence of free
labor and free institutions"); id. at app. 102 (Sen. Yates) (Guarantee will allow
freedmen to use their "own merits and exertions" to "establish for themselves a
condition of respect, ability, and prosperity"); see generally Forbath, supra note
177, at 171 (Guarantee "spoke to the social and economic circumstances not only
of former slaves but also of white free laborers").
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and provided that "all persons born" in the United States are
citizens. Each of these words is packed with meaning.
The significance of becoming a citizen of a republic rather
than the subject of a monarchy is that "none have hereditary
rights superior to others."'95 The fundamental premise of the
1866 Act was that, "A true republic rests upon the absolute
equality of rights of the whole people, high and low, rich and
poor, black and white.' 9 6
The means of achieving citizenship also reflect a rejection
of hereditary privileges. To obtain citizenship and the equal
rights that citizenship ensures, a person need not be born into
any designated race, class, or family, but merely be born a
human being in the United States. 197 This principle of "jus
soli" or "birthright citizenship" conformed to a strong strain of
egalitarianism within the Republican party that embraced
citizenship and civil rights without regard to the accident of
birth. Speaking in Faneuil Hall in 1855, Senator Sumner
rejected both Know-Nothingism 9 s and slavery because they
"attaint[ed] men for their religion and also for their birth." 9 9
A political party that "founds a discrimination on the accident
of birth, is not the party for us." 00 America was made strong
precisely by "the fusion of all races here."20
195. WOOD, supra note 44, at 169; see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 665 (1898) ("[T]he term 'citizen' seems to be appropriate to
republican freemen."); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1116 (1866) (Rep.
Wilson) (birth in the jurisdiction "makes a man a subject in England, and a
citizen here").
196. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866) (Rep. Windom); see also
id. at 1757 (Sen. Trumbull) ("The equality of rights is the basis of a
commonwealth.") (quoting Chancellor Kent).
197. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1837 (1866) (Rep. Lawrence); see
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1866) (Sen. Morrill) ("[T]he genius
of republicanism is equality, impartiality of rights and remedies among all the
citizens," and "Congress at its last session enacted that every person born in the
United States is a citizen thereof, and entitled to protection in his civil rights.").
198. In the 1850s the Know-Nothings sought to reserve public offices to
native-born Protestants, restrict immigration from Ireland and Germany, and
prevent recent immigrants from voting by implementing a twenty-one-year
naturalization period. See, e.g., Michael F. Holt, The Antimasonic and Know
Nothing Parties, in I HISTORY OF U.S. POLITICAL PARTIES 593 (Arthur M.

Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1973); Bruce Levine, Conservatism, Nativism, and Slavery:
Thomas R. Whitney and the Originsof the Know-Nothing Party, 88 J. AM. HIST.
455, 467-70 (2001).

199. Sumner, The Slave Oligarchy, supra note 133, at 12.
200. Id. at 13.
201. Id. at 12; see generally DONALD, SUMNER I, supra note 133, at 274-75
(discussing speech). The idea of citizenship without distinction based on birth
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Similarly rejecting Know-Nothingism, Lincoln noted that
half of all American citizens were not descendants of those
who were Americans at the Founding." 2 But when these
immigrants read the Declaration, "they feel that that moral
sentiment [of equality] taught in that day evidences their
relation to those men, that it is the father of all moral
principle in them, and that they have a right to claim it as
though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh, of
the men who wrote that Declaration (loud and long continued
applause) and so they are."20 3
Professor Epps shows that the capstone of this line of
Republican thought was Carl Schurz's 1859 speech, "True
Americanism,"2 °4 which argued that American nationality
"did not spring from one family, one tribe, one country, but
incorporates the vigorous elements of all civilized nations on
earth."2 0 5 America is "the colony of free humanity, whose
was a crystallization and expansion of an idea that stretched back to the
founding. See ARIELI, supra note 52, at 76. In the new American consciousness,
an American is one who "leav[es] behind him all his ancient prejudices and
manners," because "[h]ere individuals of all nations are melted into a new race
of men." Id. (quoting MICHELE-GUILLAUME ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEUR, LETTERS
FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER, 41, 51-52 (1957)); see generally KARST, supra note
1, at 83 (discussing de Crevecoeur's view that in American all people "are
melted into a new race").
202. Speech at Chicago, Illinois (July 10, 1858), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS
I, supra note 123, at 456.
203. Id. The 1860 Republican platform rejected Know-Nothingism. FONER,
supra note 142, at 257. Lincoln asserted that if the African Americans'
"exception" from the Declaration were expanded to also except foreign-born
Americans and Catholics, he would "prefer emigrating to some country where
they make no pretense of loving liberty -- to Russia, for instance, where
despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy." Letter to
Joshua F. Speed (Aug. 24, 1855), in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS I, supra note 123,
at 363; see also Letter to Theodore Canisius (May 17, 1859), in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS II, supra note 123, at 22.
204. Epps points to the speech as "a startling clear exposition of the belief of
an entire generation of Republicans that inspired a constitutional revolution
after the Civil War." EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 150, at 35.
205. Id. (quoting I CARL SCHURZ, SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND
POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ 54 (Frederic Bancroft ed., 1913)). Schurz
asserted that the country must "choose between two social organizations, one of
which is founded upon privilege, and the other upon the doctrine of equal
rights." Carl Schurz, True Americanism: A Speech Delivered in Faneuil Hall,
Boston (Apr. 18, 1859), in AMERICAN SCRIPTURES 241 (C. Van Doren ed., 2007).
While "[tihe dignity of the Roman citizen consisted in his exclusive privileges;
the dignity of the American citizen consists in holding the natural rights of his
The rejection of privilege was
neighbor just as sacred as his own." Id.
announced in the Declaration, and the Founders intended the nation's
institutions "to be the living incarnation of this idea." Id.

94
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mother-country is the world"; it is "the republic of equal
rights, where the title of manhood is the title to citizenship."2 °6
The alternative to "jus soli" or "birthright citizenship"
was "jus sanguinis," or citizenship based on lineage. Chief
Justice Taney's Dred Scott decision invoked jus sanguinis to
conclude that the Constitution granted U.S. citizenship-bybirth only to lineal descendants of those who were citizens
when the Constitution was adopted. °7 In Taney's view, this
denied U.S. citizenship to all African Americans, whether free
or slave. 208
Taney's reasoning likewise implied that the
American-born children of unnaturalized aliens were also not
U.S. citizens. 20 9 The Democrats in Congress invoked the Dred
Scott decision to argue that the 1866 Act could not
constitutionally confer U.S. citizenship on all persons born in
the country.2 1 °
The Democrats also relied on Justice Curtis's dissent in
Dred Scott, which concluded that U.S. citizenship (except
through naturalization) was determined by one's citizenship
in a State.2 11 Urging Congress to sustain the President's veto
of the 1866 Act, Senator Reverdy Johnson argued that the
former slave States defined citizenship by family lineage:
"[t]he constitution and laws of the [slave] States... declare..
206. EPPs, DEMOCRACY REBORN, supra note 150, at 35 (quoting Carl Schurz,
True Americanism: A Speech Delivered in Faneuil Hall, Boston (Apr. 18, 1859))
(emphasis added).
207. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1856). Taney's argument
had been prefigured by southern contentions that Missouri could refuse to allow
free blacks into the State because their race made them ineligible for
naturalization and that their American-born children were not citizens because
they inherited their parents' status. See ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 16th Cong., 2d
Sess. 555, 557 (1820) (Rep. Smyth); id. at 615-16 (Rep. McLane); see generally
JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608-1870,
312-14 (1978).
208. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856); see also CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866) (Sen. Cowan) (making same argument in
debate on 1866 Act); id. at 529 (Sen. Johnson) (African Americans at the
founding were not citizens, and their children "inherited the disqualification of
the ancestor"); id. at 525 (Sen. Davis) (making same argument).
209. See KETrNER, supra note 207, at 322 (the decision "called into question,
by the majority's challenge to birthright citizenship, the status of natives born
of unnaturalized alien parents"). Compare Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill,
supra note 141, at 37 (Rochester [N.Y.] Democrat) (1866 Act "secure[s] to every
human being born on American soil the same rights that any other American
enjoys by virtue of being an American").
210. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505, 529 (Sen. Johnson); id. at
1120 (Rep. Rogers); see also id. at 1295 (Rep. Latham).
211. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 581-82 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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that no descendant of a colored mother, whether she was
free or not, was to be considered a citizen by virtue of
birth. '212 Unstated by Johnson, but nonetheless the fact,
those States also determined whether the mother was
"colored" for these purposes by examining her family
lineage-anyone with less than one-eighth of "negro blood"
was deemed to be "white.2 1 3 Johnson complained that,
contrary to the southern citizenship-by-lineage statutes, the
1866 Act provided that every person born in the United
States "is to be considered a citizen by reason of the [mere]
fact of his being born."214
The Republicans rejected both of these arguments for
determining citizenship by lineage. They rejected Taney's
reading of the Constitution,2 the contention that they lacked
constitutional authority to grant citizenship based on place of
birth,216 and the southern citizenship-by-lineage statutes.2 1 7
They instead reaffirmed that, "the bill proposes to make a
citizen of every person born in the United States," including
"even the infant child of a foreigner born in this land."2" '
212. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1776-77 (1866) (Sen. Johnson); see
also Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott And
Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 281-82 (1997)
(Taney's Dred Scott opinion reflected prevailing view of both U.S. and State
citizenship); Ariela Gross, "Of Portuguese Origin:" Litigating Identity And
Citizenship Among the "Little Races" In Nineteenth Century America, 25 LAW &
HIST. REV. 467, 486 (2007) (describing Tennessee jury charge regarding
lineage). As early as the debates on the Missouri Compromise, southerners had
denied that free blacks were citizens. See KETTNER, supra note 207, at 312-14.
213. See IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 161-62 n.39 (1974).
214. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1776 (1866) (Sen. Johnson).
215. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (Rep. Wilson);
id. at 1124 (Rep. Cook); id. at 1152 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 1266 (Rep. Raymond);
id. at 1291 (Rep. Bingham); id. at 1756 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1832 (Rep.
Lawrence); id. at 1160 (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 1263 (Rep. Broomall).
216. See, e.g., id. at 2226-27 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1124 (Rep. Cook).
217. Id. at 1757 (Sen. Trumbull); see generally Gerald L. Newman, Back to
Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 491-92 (1987) (Republicans "refused the
invitation to create a hereditary caste of voteless denizens, vulnerable to
expulsion and exploitation").
218. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull); see
also id. at 498 (Sen. Trumbull) (Act rejects distinctions between children born in
U.S. to German aliens rather than Chinese aliens); id. at 1832 (Rep. Lawrence)
("Children born here are citizens without any regard to the political condition or
allegiance of their parents.") (quoting Standford's Ch. R. 583). Citizenship by
lineage was then the prevailing rule in continental Europe. See United States
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 667 (1898). The 1866 Act and, later, the
Fourteenth Amendment, rejected that principle "in the most explicit and
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In rejecting lineage as the basis for citizenship, Congress
confirmed its rejection of lineage as a basis for discrimination
in the Act's citizenship-based substantive rights. 19 An
comprehensive terms," in favor of "the fundamental principle of citizenship by
birth within the jurisdiction." Id. at 675. The grant of citizenship "was not
intended to be confined to those of any particular race or class, but to embrace
equally all races, classes, and conditions of men." Id. at 678. The Act
determines citizenship "by the place of nativity, irrespective of parentage." Id.
at 690. Of course, it is possible to argue that the principle of birthright
citizenship itself discriminates based on lineage-that citizenship is granted to
or withheld from a child based on whether her mother was present in the
United States at the time of the child's birth. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN
AND THE ALIEN 125 (2006) (noting, but not necessarily endorsing, this view).
Birthright citizenship does not discriminate based on lineage. By statute in
1866, Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604, as well as today, 8 U.S.C. § 1401
(2000), birthright citizenship is supplemented with a grant of U.S. citizenship to
the foreign-born children of U.S. citizens. So the only children discriminated
against are foreign-born children of non-U.S. citizens. Accordingly, birthright
citizenship, as supplemented, is the most egalitarian rule that is consistent with
the existence of nation-states. And even without the supplementation, the basic
rule of birthright citizenship is more accurately described as being based on the
location of the child, rather than the child's mother, at the child's birth.
Republicans of the 39th Congress certainly viewed birthright citizenship that
way. See, e.g., 10 Op. Att'y. Gen. 382 (1862) (birthright citizenship "is as
original in the child as it was in his parents," and "[i]t never 'passes by descent'
"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1116 (1866) (Rep. Wilson) (describing the
foregoing Attorney General opinion as the "ablest and most exhaustive opinion
ever given on the subject of negro citizenship").
219. Senator Trumbull made clear that the 1866 Act codified the
Republicans' idea of birthright citizenship, and, correspondingly, a rejection of
discrimination based on lineage. The Act secured the "equal rights of every
human being in the land, no matter from what quarter of the globe he or his
ancestors may have come, or what color may have been stamped upon his face
by a European or an African line." Kaczorowski, supra note 129, at 897 n.153
(quoting Trumbull's speech as reported in an unidentified newspaper article);
see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 102 (1866) (Sen. Yates) ("I am
for the black man, not as a black man; I am for the white man, not as a white
man, but I am for man irrespective of race or color; I am for God's humanity.").
In the words of Professor Karst, under the Act "[clitizenship and equality were
melded into a single policy." Karst, supra note 13, at 14; see also Farber &
Muench, supra note 122, at 264 (noting that Republicans closely tied the Act's
substantive rights to the concept of national citizenship); id. at 277 (as result of
Act and Guarantee, "American Citizenship would be linked to the possession of
fundamental rights"). Advancing Karst's work, Professor Liu has argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause requires the federal
government to ensure a minimum level (and a limited degree of inequality) in
those goods, including education, necessary to ensure the dignity and full
participation of all citizens. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and
National Citizenship, 116 YALE L. J. 330 (2006). Our research and analysis
here support that claim, especially in that we show the close connection
between the citizenship clause and the substantive rights secured by the 1866
Act. Our claim is far more modest, however, in that we show only that,
whatever the substantive rights to which citizens are entitled, they cannot
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important reason for conferring national citizenship on a
person was to ensure that he would enjoy the Act's
substantive rights without discrimination.2 20 The eminent
jurist, Representative William Lawrence of Ohio, explained:
"[i]t is citizenship .. that gives the title to these rights to all
citizens," and those rights are not "accorded only to citizens of
'some class,' or 'some race,' or 'of the least favored class,' or 'of
the most favored class,' or of a particular complexion for these
distinctions were never contemplated or recognized as
possible in fundamental civil rights, which are alike
necessary and important to all citizens, and to make
inequities in which is rank injustice."2 21
Congress rejected lineage discrimination with respect to
not only African Americans, but all persons born in the
United States. Early versions of the bill that became the
1866 Act defined citizenship for and extended protection only
to "persons of African descent."222 TenBroek shows that the
lawfully depend on one's lineage.
220. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (Rep. Thayer) (Act
protects "the fundamental rights of citizenship"); id. at 1266 (Rep. Raymond)
("Make the colored man a citizen.., and he has every right which you or I have
as citizens."); id. at 1124 (Rep. Clark) ("[Als between citizens . . . there shall be
no discrimination in civil rights."); id. at 1760 (Sen. Trumbull) (Act "declares
that in civil rights there should be an equality among all classes of citizens"); id.
at 1833 (Rep. Lawrence) (Act "protect[s] every citizen, including the millions of
people of foreign birth who will flock to our shores"); accord id. at 1292 (Rep.
Bingham) (by not extending rights to aliens, Act permitted discrimination
against them). Reviewing the legislative history of the Citizenship Clause, the
Department of Justice recently concluded that Congress should not attempt to
restrict birthright citizenship because, "[i]n America, a country that rejected
monarchy, each person is born equal, with no curse of infirmity, and no exalted
status, arising from the circumstances of his or her parentage." Citizen Reform
Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1363 Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 4 (1995) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/deny.tes.31.htm.
221. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866) (Rep. Lawrence).
Congress created an express exception from the Act's substantive protections for
some distinctions, such as those based on gender, age, and mental competence,
that are not a basis for the denial of citizenship. See infra note 307. The need
for this express exception confirms the general rule that a distinction that
cannot deny citizenship-and certainly a distinction that Congress expressly
rejected as a basis for citizenship-cannot be the basis for discrimination in the
Act's substantive provisions. The inseparable link between citizenship and a
bar on discrimination is also reflected in southern antebellum arguments that
the fact of pervasive discrimination against free blacks proved that they were
not citizens. See KETNER, supra note 207, at 320-21.
222. See Frank & Munro, supra note 158, at 139 (describing introduction by
Senator Wilson of S. 9 and S. 55). Trumbull likewise originally proposed to
define citizenship only for African Americans. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
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Republicans rejected these measures as "too narrowly
conceived... the great need and opportunity was to make the
protection permanent, to cast it in universal form (though
immediately and primarily the boon of the freedman), [and] to
make it applicable to the whole country."22 3 In amending the
bill to provide that "all persons born" in the United States are
citizens, Congress rejected descent as a legally cognizable
basis for discrimination against any citizen.22 4
Other
statements in the debates confirm that the Act secures the
rights of every person "of whatever caste or lineage they
be,"225 and protects "the children of all parentage
whatever."22' 6 The Act was thus "scarcely less to the people of
this country than Magna Charta was to the people of
England."22 7
The Fourteenth Amendment made birthright citizenship
part of the organic law of the land.22 It also extended the
Sess. 474 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull).
223. TENBROEK, supra note 120, at 177 (emphasis added).
Trumbull
explained that the provision defining citizenship only for African Americans
"was not acceptable to the Senate in that form, and it had to be withdrawn the
next day and a substitute offered." Scrapbook on the Civil Rights Bill, supra
note 141, at 132 (speech quoted in unidentified newspaper).
224. See Epps, supra note 175, at 910 (Republicans required that
membership in society "is not based on race or blood or country of origin, but on
simple shared humanity").
225. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1262 (1866) (Rep. Broomall).
226. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2891 (1866) (Sen. Conness). An
earlier bill proposed by Senator Sumner prohibited the southern States from
discriminating in civil rights on the basis of "color, race, or descent," CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865) (Sen. Sherman) (quoting bill), as did
Senator Wilson's S.9 and S.55. See id. at 39 (Sen. Wilson). Representative
Bromwell likewise drafted a resolution prohibiting discrimination based on
"color or descent."
See NELSON, supra note 57, at 77-78; see generally
Scrapbook on Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 141, at 20 (National AntiSlavery Standard, July 22, 1866) (urging adoption of an amendment to prohibit
States from discriminating on grounds of "race, color, or descent"). Statements
in the debates make clear that the legislators made no bright-line distinction
between "race," "descent," "lineage," "blood," or "parentage." See, e.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 497 (Sen.
VanWinkle); id. at 504 (Sen. Johnson); id. at 1679 (Pres. Johnson's veto
message); id. at 3213 (Rep. Niblack); id. at 40 (Sen. Morrill); id. at 2891 (Sen.
Cowan); id. (Sen. Conness); id. at 3038 (Sen. McDougall).
227. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866) (Rep. Lawrence); see
also id. at 570 (Sen. Morrill) (1866 Act was "revolutionary" but it was justified
because "we [are] in the midst of revolution"); Barry Sullivan, Historical
Reconstruction,ReconstructionHistory, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98
YALE L.J. 541, 550 (1989) (1866 Act "was itself revolutionary because it would
require a radical reordering of southern society").
228. Congress included birthright citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment
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guarantee of equal protection beyond all "citizens" to all
"persons." Bingham successfully argued that the 1866 Act's
restriction of rights to only "citizens" did not go far enough in
rejecting the status-based, feudal ideas of the Old World. The
1866 Act "commit[ed] the terrible enormity of distinguishing
here in the laws in respect to life, liberty, and property
between the citizen and the stranger."22 9 States should not be
permitted to classify on that basis:
The great men who made [the Fifth Amendment] . . .
abolished the narrow and limited phrase of the old Magna
Charta of five hundred years ago, which gave the
protection of the laws only to 'free men' and inserted in its
stead the more comprehensive words, 'no person,' . . .
Thus, in respect to life and liberty and property, the
people by their Constitution declared the equality of all
men. 230
Congress of course accepted Bingham's proposal, and the
in order to remove any doubt as to the constitutionality of the grant of that
citizenship in the 1866 Act. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768
(1866) (Sen. Wade); id. at 3031 (Sen. Henderson); id. at 2890 (Sen. Howard).
The Democrats again urged that citizenship be reserved for descendants of the
original citizens. See id. at 2938 (Sen. Hendricks). The Republicans again
denied that such was ever the law. See, e.g., id. at 2890 (Sen. Howard); id. at
3031 (Sen. Henderson).
229. Id. at 1292 (Rep. Bingham).
230. Id.; see also id. at 1090 (1866) (Rep. Bingham) (Guarantee meant to
protect "all persons, whether citizens or strangers"). Bingham had routinely
contrasted the Magna Charta, which applied to "freemen," and therefore
"secured no privileges to vassals or slaves," to the Fifth Amendment, which
protected "all persons" and was therefore "a new gospel to mankind." CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862) (Rep. Bingham) (Constitution protects
all persons "[n]o matter upon what spot on the earth's surface they were born;
no matter whether an Asiatic or African, a European or an American sun first
burned upon them; no matter whether citizens or strangers; no matter whether
rich or poor"); see also CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1861) (Rep.
Bingham) ("The Constitution has the same care for the rights of the stranger
within your gates as for the rights of the citizen."); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d
Sess. 266 (1863) (Rep. Bingham) (Constitution "is no respecter of persons [and]
declares that the poor and the rich, the citizen and the stranger within your
gates, are alike sacred before the sublime majesty of its laws"); BEAUREGARD,
supra note 138, at 97 ("Natural law must protect the privileges and immunities
of all the citizens as well as aliens in the Republic.") (quoting letter from
Bingham to Andrew F. Ross (Jan. 10, 1866)). Bingham heaped scorn on the
Lecompton constitution's idea that all freemen are equal when they form a social
compact; instead, the Declaration provides that all men are equal, and there is
"no inferior class of human beings" outside the social compact. CONG. GLOBE,
35th Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1858) (Rep. Bingham). Natural rights were "as
imperishable as the human soul, and as universal as the human race." CONG.
GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 136 (1857) (Rep. Bingham).
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Guarantee extends to all persons. Bingham subsequently
sponsored 231 the Enforcement Act of 1870, which, among
other things, re-enacted the 1866 Act in toto and, in a
separate section, reiterated the ban on discrimination in the
making or enforcement of contracts but extended the
protection to "all persons."2 32

The Republicans self-consciously reached back to the
Founders' principle against hereditary distinctions and
enacted it into positive law in order to reaffirm and extend to
African Americans the "white man's charter of freedom,"
suppress southern aristocracy, and promote the social
mobility promised by Free Labor ideology. They did so by
securing the rights of all citizens (not subjects), defined as all
(not some) persons (not just African Americans) born (merely
born, not born into a favored race, class, or family) in the
United States. And even that protection was too status-based,
so the Guarantee extended its security to all persons
regardless of citizenship, and then the 1866 Act was modified
likewise. Congress thus "put aside the creed of the despot, the
monarchist, the aristocrat," and required that "race or color,
inferiority or superiority" shall cease to be "terms of
2 3 Inherited privileges had been outlawed:
exclusion.""
All attempts in this country to keep alive the old idea of
orders of men, distinctions of class, noble and ignoble,
231. The relevant provisions originated in the Senate bill sponsored by
Senator Stewart, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870) (Sen. Stewart)

(S.365), and were concurred in by the conference committee which included
Bingham, to whose legislation regarding voting rights (H.R. 1293) those
provisions were added as an amendment. See id. at 3871 (Rep. Bingham).
232. Section 1 of the 1866 Act was reenacted by section 18 of the Act of May
31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140. And Section 16 of the 1870 Act extended
the right to make and enforce contracts to "all persons." Id.; see CONG. GLOBE,
41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3871 (1870) (Rep. Bingham) (1870 Act extends equal
protection to immigrants); id. at 1536 (Sen. Stewart) (1870 Act "extends
[protection] to aliens, so that all persons who are in the United States shall
have the equal protection of our laws"); id. at app. 4275 (1870) (Rep. Sargeant)
(1870 Act extends protection to "every person whatever within our border.., to
everything wearing the form of humanity"); see generally Comment,
Developments In the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29, 58-59
(discussing 1870 Act).
233. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1866) (Sen. Morrill) (debate on
African American suffrage in the District of Columbia).

20091 UNLAWFULNESS OF LEGACY PREFERENCES 101
superior and inferior, antagonism of races, are so many
efforts at resurrection and anarchy. In a nation of
professed freemen whose political axioms are those of
universal liberty and human rights, no public tranquility
is possible while these
rights are denied to portions of the
234
American people.
Given that neither the proponents nor opponents of
legacy preferences in college admissions have consulted the
legislative history of the 1866 Act or the Guarantee, we
thought it useful to do so in detail here. But we cannot
improve on the succinct conclusion reached by Justice
Stewart nearly 30 years ago: "[Tihe Framers of our
Constitution lived at a time when the Old World still
operated in the shadow of ancient feudal traditions. As
products of the Age of Enlightenment, they set out to
establish a society that recognized no distinctions among
white men on account of their birth." 238 The Guarantee
"promised to carry to its necessary conclusion a fundamental
principle upon which this Nation had been founded-that the
law would honor no preference based on lineage." 236
B. Case Law Confirms That Legacy Preferences in Public
UniversitiesAre Subject to Strict Scrutiny.
The conclusion derived from the legislative history is
confirmed by the Equal Protection case law. The Supreme
Court has consistently said that discrimination based on
"lineage" or "ancestry" (apart from any additional or
concurrent discrimination based on racial group) is inherently
suspect.23 7 More broadly, the Court has repeatedly held, in a
variety of contexts, that heightened scrutiny applies to
234. Id. at 41.
235. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531 n.13 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
236. Id. at 531; see also Reinstein, supra note 118, at 403 ("According to the
Republicans [of the 39th Congress], the principle of equal treatment that they
then constitutionalized had originated in the founding. The Founders had
rejected the doctrine that the right to rule could be vested in families and
dynasties; and, to the Republicans, it was a short step to prohibit caste
distinctions and class legislation based on the inheritance of race."); John
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1412 (1992) ("Trumbull derived his ban on race discrimination [in the
1866 Act] from the more general principle of the equality of citizens.").
237. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996); Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 n.4 (1976); Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 73 & n.22 (1972).
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discrimination based on "the accident of birth."23

We examine below three sets of such cases. The first
directly addresses lineage/ancestry discrimination. The
second establishes that the prohibition against lineage
discrimination decisively informs the ban on race
discrimination-that race discrimination is unlawful in
significant part because it is lineage discrimination writ
large. The third set of cases, concerning children born to
unmarried parents, confirms that discrimination against
children based on the status of their parents elicits
heightened scrutiny.
1. Cases on Ancestry/Lineage
The Court in Hirabayashiv. United States famously held

that, "distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
24 ° the Court made clear
equality."2 39 In Qyama v. California

that the prohibited "ancestry" distinctions include those
based on individual family lineage-on the identity or status
of one's parents-in addition to those based on racial or
238. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992); Ristaino v. Ross,
424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
Two areas for further research are prohibitions on lineage discrimination under
State law (see supra note 114), and under international law; see, e.g.,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. No. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (prohibiting discrimination based on
"birth"). For example, the constitutions of the following countries prohibit
discrimination on the basis of "origin": Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria
art. 6(2); Constitution of the Republic of Estonia art. 12; Constitution of Finland
art. 6(2); Constitution of the French Republic art. 2(1); Constitution of the
Republic of Lithuania art. 29(2); Federal Constitution of Swiss Confederation
art. 8(2); Constitution of Japan art. 14(1); these on the basis of "descent:"
Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark art. 70; Constitution of the Republic of
Slovakia art. 12(2); and these on the basis of "birth," "parentage," or "ancestry:"
Federal Constitutional Laws of the Republic of Austria art. 7(1); Basic Law of
the Federal Republic of Germany art. 3(3); Constitution of the Republic of
Hungary art. 70/A(1); Constitution of the Portuguese Republic art. 13(2);
Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain art. 14; and Human Rights Act 1998
(U.K.) art. 14. See ROBERT L. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (2008).

Oxford and Cambridge Universities have terminated their legacy preferences.
See GOLDEN, supra note 12, at 125, 291.
239. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). The Court there
upheld restrictions against citizens of Japanese descent, but only as an
exception-based on the exigency of war-to the general rule against
discrimination based on ancestry. Id.
240. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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ethnic group.
The California statute in Oyama prohibited aliens who
were ineligible for American citizenship from owning
agricultural land, and any property that they transferred
with the intent to evade the statute escheated to the State.
Such intent was presumed whenever an ineligible alien paid
the consideration for a transfer to a citizen or an eligible
alien.2 41 Generally applicable California law presumed that a
parent conveying property to his child intended a gift, but the
statute presumed, in effect, that an ineligible alien conveying
to his child intended a trust in which the child held the title,
unlawfully, for the benefit of the parent.24 2
Plaintiff Fred Oyama was an American citizen whose
father, a Japanese national ineligible for citizenship,
transferred real estate to him. In striking down the statute,
the Court in several instances referred to the statute's racial
animus,24 3 but made clear that the prohibited discrimination
was based not on racial group, but "is based solely on [the
plaintiff child's] parents' country of origin, "244 that is, on his
"different lineage. 24 5
The Court distinguished, rather than overruled, its prior
decision in Cockrill v. California, which had held that the
same statute did not unlawfully discriminate against
Japanese donors based on their racial or ethnic group.2 46
Oyama thus made clear that it was the differential treatment
of children based on the status of their parents-not the
treatment of the children or their parents based on their
241. Id. at 636.
242. Id. at 641-42.
243. Id. at 644, 646.
244. Id. at 640.
245. Id. at 641; see also id. (discrimination based on whether "parents can[ ]
be naturalized"); id. at 642 (discrimination based on "the father's nationality"
and on whether "the father is ineligible for citizenship"); id. at 647
(discrimination "because of his father's country of origin"); id. at 641 ("[Tlhe
California law points in one direction for citizens . . . whose parents cannot be
naturalized, and in another for all other children."); id. at 644 ("[Tjhe father's
deeds were visited on the son."). The dissent confirmed that the discrimination
found unlawful by the majority was that "against sons of persons ineligible for
citizenship." Id. at 685 (Reed, J., dissenting); see also id. at 686.
246. Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258, 262 (1925). Later in the same
Term, the Court found unlawful a California statute that discriminated against
resident aliens of Japanese descent. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410, 422 (1948) (Guarantee prohibits State from withholding
commercial fishing license from resident aliens).
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racial or ethnic group-that made the discrimination
unlawful.24 7
Oyama is a key decision establishing that discrimination
based on heredity or lineage-apart from any concurrent or
additional discrimination based on racial or ethnic group or
national origin 2 4 -is unlawful under the Guarantee. And the
Court subsequently has consistently cited Oyama for the
proposition that discrimination based on ancestry or lineage
is subject to strict scrutiny.24 9
This prohibition on discrimination based on heredity or
lineage was applied and extended by the Court in Plyler v.
Doe.25 ° The State of Texas denied a free public education to
children who could not prove that they had been lawfully
admitted into the United States. In one sense, the State
could be viewed as having denied the benefit to the children
based on their own status as undocumented aliens. As
minors, however, the children were not themselves
247. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 645, 660 n.27 (1948); see also id. at
686 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's decision is that the presumption denies
Fred Oyama [the child] the equal protection of the laws because grantees are
treated differently if they are sons of ineligible aliens than if they are the sons
of others."). The dissenters in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945),
had earlier made clear that the proscription on discrimination based on
"ancestry" is not confined to racial or ethnic groups. Justice Jackson concluded
that Korematsu was entitled to be judged on his own merits rather than on who
his parents were or what they might have done:
Even if all of one's antecedents had been convicted of treason, the
Constitution forbids its penalties to be visited upon him, for it provides
that 'no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attained.' Article 3, s 3,
cl. 2. But here is an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime
merely because this prisoner is the son of parents as to whom he had
no choice, and belongs to a race from which there is no way to resign.
Id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting)
("All residents of this nation are kin in some way by blood or culture to a foreign
land . . .[But] [t]hey must . . . be treated at all times as the heirs of the
American experiment and as entitled to all the rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the Constitution.").
248. The discrimination in Oyama has sometimes loosely been referred to as
having been based on "national origin." See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 780 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 n.10 (1976); San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 n.64 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring
and dissenting). But plaintiff Fred Oyama's nation of origin was the United
States. The discrimination against him was based not on his, but his father's,
nation of origin. It was based on his lineage-on the status or conduct of his
parents.
249. See supra note 237.
250. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

2009] UNLAWFULNESS OF LEGACY PREFERENCES 105
responsible for having entered the country unlawfully-their
parents were.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan held that,
"legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control
suggests a kind of 'class or caste' treatment that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish."25 1 While
undocumented aliens cannot properly be a "suspect class"
because their status is the product of voluntary action, "these
arguments do not apply with the same force to classifications
imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal
entrants. 52
Heightened scrutiny applied because "the
children who are plaintiffs in these cases 'can affect neither
their parents' conduct nor their own status,'' 25 3 and "no child
is responsible for his birth."25 4 Although the children were
themselves unlawfully present in the country, denying a free
education to them "poses an affront to one of the goals of the
Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental
barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement
on the basis of individual merit."2 55
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justices Souter
251. Id. at 216 n.14.
252. Id. at 219-20 (emphasis in original). Justice Powell's concurring opinion
reached the same conclusion, for the same reasons. See id. at 238.
253. Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770); see also id. at 223
(legislation affected "a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status").
254. Id. (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
255. Id. at 221-22. In a concurring opinion in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55
(1982), Justice Brennan noted that "equality of citizenship is of the essence in
our Republic," and that, "the American aversion to aristocracy developed long
before the Fourteenth Amendment and is, of course, reflected elsewhere in the
Constitution." Id. at 69 n.3 (citing prohibition on titles of nobility). Rather than
paying homage to ancestry or lineage, the Constitution "requires attention to
individual merit, to individual need." Id. at 70. In Hooper v. Bernalillo County
Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 n.14 (1985), the Court quoted Justice Brennan's
opinion in Zobel for the proposition that, "the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 'does not provide for and does not allow for, degrees of
citizenship based on length of residence. And the Equal Protection Clause
would not tolerate such distinctions.' " See generally Mark G. Yudof, Equal
Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination:One Small Cheer for Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1366, 1394 (1990)
("[A]rbitrariness lies in classifying persons in accordance with their birthrights
(slave status) or other characteristics (race) over which they have little or no
control; a reasonable classification takes into account their wills, the things they
are able to choose to do or not do within the limits of their capabilities and the
social order.").
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and Ginsburg in Miller v. Albright, confirmed that, "this
Court, I assume, would use heightened scrutiny to review
discriminatory laws based upon ancestry, say, laws that
denied voting rights or educational opportunity based upon
the religion, or the racial makeup, of a parent or
grandparent."25 6 Given that a child need not have the same

religion as her parent or grandparent, Justice Breyer clearly
intends that distinctions based on ancestry or lineage itself,
not (only) on religion or race, elicits heightened scrutiny." 7
2. Cases on Race
The case law also recognizes that strict scrutiny applies
to race discrimination in part because it is a form of
discrimination based on lineage or ancestry. Justice Powell's
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
held that race discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny
because the Guarantee protects "every person regardless of
his background,"258 and "a State's distribution of benefits or
imposition of burden [cannot] hinge[] on ancestry or the color
of a person's skin."259 Justice Brennan's opinion agreed that,
"human equality is closely associated with the proposition
that differences in color or creed, birth or status, are neither
significant0 nor relevant to the way in which persons should be
6
treated.

2

256. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 476 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
None of the other opinions of a badly fractured Court reached this issue. Nor
did any of the opinions in a subsequent case that addressed the same statute.
See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
257. See also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 30 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (State tax exemption for children of homeowner parents denies
equal protection because it "establishes a privilege of a medieval character" by
"treat[ing] [children] differently solely because of their different heritage"). The
majority upheld the statute in Nordlinger because only the rational basis test
applies to State tax statutes, and review of exemptions to such statutes is
especially deferential. Id. at 11 (majority opinion). Moreover, the plaintiff did
not assert that the heredity discrimination required heightened scrutiny. See
id. at 10-11.
258. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (plurality
opinion). In his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), Justice Harlan wrote that race discrimination is
unlawful because: "The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law
regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color
when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are
involved." Id.
259. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
260. Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
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In Rice v. Cayetano261 the Court held that the State of
Hawaii violated the Fifteenth Amendment's ban on racebased voting qualifications by limiting the franchise to
persons with "native Hawaiian" ancestry.
Racial
discrimination is unlawful in large part because it is a type of
discrimination based on ancestry or lineage:
One of the principalreasons race is treated as a forbidden
classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own
merit and essential qualities. An inquiry into ancestral
lines is not consistent with respect based on the unique
personality each of us possesses, a respect the
Constitution
itself secures in its concern for persons and
262
citizens.

3.

Cases on Parents'Marital Status

The prohibition on hereditary distinctions has likewise
animated the Court's jurisprudence applying heightened
scrutiny to discrimination against children born out of
wedlock. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the Court
also id. at 360-61 (requiring strict scrutiny when State decision is based on "an
immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set

aside").
261. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000).

262. Id. at 517 (emphasis added); see also Parents Involved In Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007) (quoting this passage from
Rice); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531, 541 n.13 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 235-36). Similarly,
Justice Scalia's opinion inAdarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), noted
that a classification based on race "is alien to the Constitution's focus upon the
individual, . . . and its rejection of dispositions . . . based on blood, see U.S.

CONST. art. III § 3 ('[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood');
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ('No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States')." See also Hills, supra note 44, at 1601 ("[Rlacial classifications violate
a deep principle against hereditary status reflected in the Constitution's 'Title of
Nobility' and 'Corruption of Blood' Clauses."). That proscriptions against racial
discrimination were extensions of the principle against hereditary distinctions
does not require or even suggest that preferences in favor of historically
oppressed racial groups should be subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Guarantee. It would be perfectly reasonable, both logically and in
light of history, to conclude that preferences to any person based on heredity or
lineage are generally subject to strict scrutiny, but that an exception applies
when government grants a preference in order to ameliorate the effects of past
societal discrimination. The history of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests
that such preferences in favor of historically oppressed racial groups are clearly
permissible, if not required. See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and
the Legislative History of the FourteenthAmendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
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held that a State could not lawfully prevent such children
from recovering workers' compensation death benefits.26 3
Discrimination against children based on their parents'
status elicits heightened scrutiny because "legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
264
wrongdoing," and "no child is responsible for his birth."
The Guarantee "enable[s] us to strike down discriminatory
265
laws relating to status of birth.
Similarly, in Mathews v. Lucas266 the Court applied
heightened scrutiny to a federal statute that required out-ofwedlock children to meet additional proof requirements in
order to obtain survivor insurance benefits, because the
statute used "a characteristic determined by causes not
within the control of the . . . [child], and it bears no relation to
the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to
society."2 67 Agreeing that heightened scrutiny was required,
but disagreeing that the statute survived such scrutiny,
Justice Stevens dissented because the government must be
"especially sensitive to discrimination on grounds of birth."268
Citing the Declaration and the prohibition on titles of
nobility, he noted that the Constitution "equally would
prohibit the United States from attaching any badge of
2 69
ignobility to a citizen at birth.

Against all of these consistent cases stands a single
authority, the five to four decision in Kotch v. Board of
Riverport Pilot Commissioners for Port of New Orleans,
263. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
264. Id. at 175.
265. Id. at 176.
266. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
267. Id. at 505; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)
(heightened scrutiny required because out-of-wedlock children "can affect
neither their parents' conduct nor their own status").
268. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 520 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269. Id.; see also Eskra v. Morten, 524 F.2d 9, 13 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.)
(proscription on titles of nobility prevents out-of-wedlock child from "being
treated by her government as a second-class person"). Discrimination against
out-of-wedlock children has been subjected to heightened scrutiny, rather than
strict scrutiny, only because that status is often entangled with the State's
interest in ensuring proof of paternity. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
461 (1988); Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456
U.S. 91, 97 (1982).
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upholding a Louisiana statute that gave incumbent State
riverboat pilots discretion to select only their friends and
Writing for four dissenters,
relatives as apprentices. 7 0
Justice Rutledge asserted that discrimination based on
lineage is unlawful under the Guarantee:
[The statute as applied] makes admission to the ranks of
pilots turn finally on consanguinity. Blood is, in effect,
made the crux of selection. That, in my opinion, is
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
against denial of the equal protection of the laws. The
door is thereby closed to all not having blood relationship
to presently licensed pilots ....

[Ilt is beyond legislative

power to make entrance
to [employment as a pilot] turn
27 1
upon such a criterion.

The majority upheld the statute because permitting
incumbent pilots to select their apprentices was "[not]
unrelated" to the State's goal of securing a safe and efficient
pilotage system. 2
Professor Torke has demonstrated that
the majority decision is best understood as a reaction against
the then-recently passed era of substantive due process
attacks on economic regulation.2 73 Throughout the litigation,
plaintiffs had cast their challenge to the statute in the
language of substantive due process, with "only a sideways
glance" at the discrimination based on lineage. 4
270. Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Com'rs for Port of New Orleans, 330 U.S.
552 (1947).

271. Id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 564. The majority justified its decision by asserting that pilotage
is "a highly personalized calling," id. at 558, selection of apprentices from a
localized area would ensure that they had specialized knowledge of the weather
and water hazards, id. at 559, open competition for apprentice positions would
adversely affect the public interest, id. at 561, and the statute affected a
"unique institution of pilotage in the light of its history in Louisiana," id. at
564.
273. See Torke, supra note 44, at 563.
274. Id.; see also id. at 588-92; Larson, supra note 4, at 1412. The Kotch
majority opinion is in significant tension with the judicial opinions that were
faithful to Congress's intent in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. See,
e.g., Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 113 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(Fourteenth Amendment prohibits States from "pass[ing] a law of caste, making
all trades and professions, or certain enumerated trades and professions,
hereditary"); id. at 105, 109 (Field, J., dissenting) (Guarantee was "intended to
give practical effect to the Declaration of 1776," and therefore "all grants of
exclusive privileges, in contravention of this equality, are against common right,
and void"); In re Ah Fong, 1 Fed. Cas. 213, 218 (C.D. Cal. 1874) (Field, J.)
(Guarantee prohibits "[dliscriminating and partial legislation, favoring
particular persons").

110

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

The Court today likely would not follow the Kotch
majority. The Court consistently cites Oyama, decided the
year after Kotch, for the proposition that ancestry
discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny.2 7
And Justice
Brennan's opinion in Bakke cites the Kotch dissent for the
proposition that "advancement sanctioned, sponsored, or
approved by the State should ideally be based on individual
merit or achievement, or at the least on factors within the
control of an individual."2 76
On the current Court, Justice Stevens has strongly and
consistently condemned discrimination based on family
lineage.27 v Justice Kennedy's individualistic approach to the
Guarantee is especially compatible with the approach that we
suggest.18 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg, asserted in Miller v. Albright that heightened
scrutiny applies to family lineage discrimination.27 9 Chief
Justice Roberts's and Justice Alito's "color-blind" approach to
the Guarantee, 28 ° and Chief Justice Roberts's assertion that
the prohibition on race discrimination is an extension of the
fundamental prohibition on being "judged by ancestry instead
of by [one's] own merit and essential qualities, '28 1 also reveal
a disposition to prohibit lineage discrimination. Justice Scalia
has forcefully asserted that the Constitution prohibits
275. See supra note 237.
276. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 264, 361 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see Harper v. Virginia State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 682 n.3 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Kotch
for proposition that Court has rejected Equal Protection claim based on
"consanguinity"); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1948) (upholding
statute prohibiting all women except wives or daughters of bar owners from
being bartenders, on ground that State could lawfully preclude all women from
being bartenders and therefore can preclude less than all).
277. Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan's opinion in Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 247 (1982); discerned lineage discrimination in Nordlinger v. Hahn,
505 U.S. 1, 30 (1992); and authored the dissent in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 520 n.3 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting), asserting that the government
must be "especially sensitive to discrimination on grounds of birth."
278. See supra text accompanying notes 261-62 and infra note 322. He also
authored the Court's opinions in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), and
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which pointedly cited Oyama v.
California,332 U.S. 633 (1948), for the proposition that ancestry discrimination
is subject to heightened scrutiny.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 256-57.
280. See Parents Involved In Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2782 (2007); see generally ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR BLIND
CONSTITUTION (1992).
281. See supra note 262.
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"dispositions ...based on blood. 2 These opinions, together
with the legislative history and case law addressed above,
provide solid grounds for courts to subject legacy preferences
in public universities to strict scrutiny.
C. Case Law Confirms the Unlawfulness of Legacy
Preferences in Private Universities under the 1866 Act.
Relevant case law under the 1866 Act is less plentiful
than that under the Guarantee, but the proscription of
The
discrimination based on heredity is equally clear.
"race"
discrimination
Supreme Court has indicated that the
barred by the Act is broadly defined to include family descent.
We show below that the Act can prohibit racial-group
discrimination against whites (and even, in 1866, against
blacks) only if the Act also proscribes discrimination based on
family lineage. Additional legislative history confirms that
this is the correct reading of the Act.
1.

A1-Khazraji Holds That the Act Protects Families
from Ancestry Discrimination.

In Runyon v. McCrary, the Supreme Court held that the
1866 Act prohibits racial discrimination in the admissions
decisions of private schools.28 3 In St. Francis College v. Althat the "racial"
Khazraji8 4 the Court indicated
discrimination prohibited by the Act includes discrimination
based on family lineage. 28 1 In Al-Khazraji the Court held that
an American born in Iraq could state a claim of unlawful race
discrimination to the extent that he alleged that he was
"subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that
he was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or
nation of his origin, or his religion."2 8 Holding that the Act
bars "race" discrimination, the Court observed that
282. See supra note 262. But he also joined Justice Thomas's dictum that
legacy preferences are lawful. See supra note 3.
283. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
284. Saint Francis Coll. v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
285. Plaintiff, a United States citizen born in Iraq, was a professor who was
denied tenure by the defendant college. Id. at 606. He sued on the ground that
the denial of tenure was based on "national origin, religion, and/or race." Id.
The district court had entered summary judgment against plaintiff on the
ground that discrimination based on Arabian ancestry is not "race"
discrimination actionable under the Act. Id.
286. Id. at 613.
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dictionaries in the mid-nineteenth century defined race very
broadly to include, for example:
a "continued series of descendants from a parent who is
called the stock," . .."[t]he lineage of a family," .. .or
"descendants of a common ancestor," . . . . The 1887
edition of Webster's expanded the definition somewhat:
"The descendants of a common ancestor; a family, tribe,
people or nation,
believed or presumed to belong to the
2 87
same stock."

The Court noted that, even today, dictionaries still define race
as including "a family, tribe, people, or nation belonging to
the same stock."28 ' Encyclopedias in the nineteenth century,
and legislators during the debates, also described various
ethnic groups, such as Finns, Basques, Germans, Mongolians,
Hungarians, Jews, etc. as constituting "races."2 It was "not
until the 20th century that dictionaries began referring ...to
race as involving divisions of mankind based upon different
physical characteristics." 290
The Court accordingly held that "Congress intended to
protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons
who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because
of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics.
Such
discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress
intended [the Act] to forbid whether or not it would be
classified as racial in terms of modern scientific or social
theory."2 9 ' "Ancestry" being an improper classification, AlKhazraji was required to show only that he was discriminated
against because he "was born an Arab,"29 2 not because he had

"a distinctive physiognomy. "293

Discrimination based on family lineage fits comfortably
287. Id. at 610-11 (citations omitted).
288. Id. at 611-12 (citations omitted).
289. Id.
290. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611 (1987) (citations
omitted).
291. Id. at 613 (emphasis added). In his dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases,
Justice Field asserted that the special monopoly granted there violated the 1866
Act because it was "similar in principle and as odious in character as the
restrictions imposed in the last century upon the peasantry in some parts of
France." Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 92 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
The special privileges in France were hereditary, "vest[ing] in the Lords of the
.vicinage." Id. at 93.
292. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613.
293. Id.
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within Al-Khazraji's broad definition of "race" discrimination.
In the Court's language, legacy preferences discriminate on
the basis of ancestry, and they do so against "identifiable
classes of persons"-classes consisting of the children of nonalumni.

94

This reading is confirmed by multiple aspects of AlKhazraji. The Court repeatedly referred to "race" as
including "the lineage of a family,"2 95 and similarly equated
race with "stock," i.e., lineal descent.2 96 And the Court held
that race included "ancestry,"2 97 which in both common usage
and Supreme Court usage includes family lineage within only
two generations. 29' Indeed, Al-Khazraji cites Oyama as an
example of discrimination based on "ancestry." 99
The Court explicitly separated race and ancestry from
any connection to group physiognomy or ethnicity. 0 0 The
requirement that Al-Khazraji show that he was discriminated
against because he was "born an Arab" thus meant no more
than that he was born to a parent who had some measure of
"Arab blood," without any requirement that his parents have
"Arab" physiognomy, characteristics, or culture.
The
touchstone is discrimination based on birth, i.e., descent, or
family lineage. Indeed, the Act also protects "whites,"31 so
Al-Khazraji could have also satisfied the requirement by
294. The Court did not require that the class identifier be physical or ethnic
characteristics. Id. ("[A] distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for.
. . protection."). So an identifier based on family lineage, such as a listing in
the Social Register or Burke's Peerage & Gentry, should suffice. In the case of
discrimination against the children of non-alumni, the class is identified by
consulting the applicant's answer to the family lineage question asked on the
application form.
295. Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 611-12.
297. Id. at 613.
298. See, e.g., Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/ (last visited
August 26, 2008) ("ancestry" defined as "1. family or ancestral descent,
lineage"); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (inquiry into "ancestral
lines" demeans dignity of individuals); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 471
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("ancestry" discrimination includes that based on
identity of parent or grandparent). The Court in Cayetano noted that a statute
granting a benefit based on having only one sixty-fourth of a particular type of
ancestry, or having ancestors who resided in a particular location-regardless of
their racial group-may well be "racial" legislation. Rice, 528 U.S. at 514 ("it is
far from clear" that this 'would not be a race-based qualification").
299. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613 n. 5.
300. Id. at 613.
301. See infra text accompanying notes 314-17.

114

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

showing, if it was true, that he was discriminated against
because he "was born a white"-i.e., born to a parent who had
30 2
some "white blood."
Lastly, in defining the scope of prohibited "race"
discrimination, Al-Khazraji looked to the 1866 debates as
well as dictionaries. As we showed in detail above, those
debates reveal that Congress expressly incorporated the
Declaration's proscription on hereditary distinctions among
white men; prohibited the lineage-based pretensions of
southern aristocracy; ensured each citizen's ability to rise or
fall based on individual merit; and rejected citizenship based
on family lineage. And Congress knew from the South's
citizenship-by-lineage and race-definition statutes that "race"
inevitably collapses into family lineage. 31
Congress
proscribed discrimination based on inherited race by codifying
and expanding the more fundamental proscription on
inherited distinctions. The legislative history thus compels a
literal reading of Al-Khazraji's statement that the prohibited
"race" discrimination includes discrimination based on "the
30 4
lineage of a family."
2.

The "White Citizens" PhraseDoes Not PermitLineage
Discrimination.

Supporters of legacy preferences may argue for a
narrower interpretation of the Act based on the statutory
phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens." As originally
proposed, and as initially passed by the Senate, the bill
provided that all citizens "shall have the same right" to make
and enforce contracts. 3 °5 The bill was then amended in the
House to provide that all citizens shall have the same right to
make and enforce contracts "as is enjoyed by white
citizens."" 6 Legacy-preference supporters may argue that the
additional phrase was intended to limit the Act's prohibition
302. See Saint Francis Coll. v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1987)
(Court is "quite sure" that the Act prohibits "discrimination by one Caucasian
against another").
303. See supra text accompanying notes 212-13.
304. Subsequent legislative history also argues against a too-narrow reading
of the 1866 Act. See CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105
Stat. 1071 (statutorily overruling Court's narrow reading in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)).
305. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull).
306. Id. at 1115 (Rep. Wilson).
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to "race" discrimination narrowly defined, i.e., defined in a
way to exclude family lineage. 7 That argument is defeated
307. A contention that the 1866 Act prohibits discrimination other than that
based on race would be contrary to the language, but not the holding, in several
Supreme Court cases. In Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), the Court
considered whether an African American could remove to federal court a State
prosecution against him arising from a sit-in at an Atlanta restaurant. He
invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), which provides for removal to federal court of
claims involving "equal civil rights," on the ground that the prosecution violated
Section 201(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the course of holding that the
1866 Act provided the paradigm of a statute providing for "equal civil rights"
under Section 1443(1), the Court stated that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white
citizens" was "added in committee in the House, apparently to emphasize the
racial character of the rights being protected." Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
The Court provided no analysis and no citation of authority for the assertion
that this language "apparently" had this particular meaning.
The Court also noted that the 1866 Act's legislative history indicated "that
Congress intended to protect a limited category of rights, specifically defined in
terms of racial equality." Id. The balance of the Court's opinion makes clear,
however, that these are two separate criteria, i.e., that the 1866 Act protected a
limited category of rights (i.e., the rights to make contracts, inherit property,
etc.), and that the rights were protected against discrimination including but
not necessarily limited to discrimination based on race. Id. at 792. Indeed, the
Court's holding was that Section 201(a) of the 1964 Act fit the paradigm of the
1866 Act, and that removal was therefore proper. Id. Section 201(a) is not
limited to race discrimination, but protects against "discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." Id. at 793
n.20. Nevertheless, based on Rachel, subsequent dicta in various opinions
imply that the 1866 Act reaches only "racial" discrimination. See, e.g., Gen.
Bldg. Contr. Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 384 (1982); McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968). But see Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (Act "relates primarily to racial discrimination") (emphasis
added).
The legislative history undermines the notion that the 1866 Act protects
against only race discrimination. Under the natural-law theory that informs
the Act, the rights of white citizens are subject to reasonable regulation by the
State. The phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" simply means that the rights
of all citizens, like those of white citizens, are subject to such reasonable
regulation. As originally proposed, and as originally passed by the Senate, the
bill provided that all citizens shall have the same right to contract. Opponents
noted that a literal interpretation of the bill would preclude the States from
imposing any limits on the enumerated rights based on gender, age, or mental
capacity. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1781-82 (1866) (Sen.
Cowan). Representative Wilson offered the phrase "as is enjoyed by white
citizens" as an amendment, and "the reason for offering it was this: it was
thought by some persons that unless these qualifying words were incorporated
in the bill, those rights might be extended to all citizens, whether male or
female, majors or minors. So that the words are intended to operate as a
limitation and not as an extension." Id. at 157 (1866) (Rep. Wilson); see also id.
at 1294 (Rep. Wilson) (denying that the bill "invades the States to enforce
equality of rights in respect to those things which properly and rightfully
depend on State regulations and laws").
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by two aspects of the Court's decision in McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail TransportationCompany, where the Court held that
the "white citizens" phrase is "without substantive effect" and
that the Act protects white persons against racial
discrimination.3 08
a. The PhraseIs Superfluous.
The Act's legislative history led the McDonald Court to
conclude that the "white citizens" phrase is meaningless. °9
Senate Bill No. 61 as originally passed by the Senate
provided that all citizens shall have the "same right" to make
and enforce contracts-language that would clearly prohibit
discrimination based on family lineage.
The qualifying
phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" was added in the
House at the request of Representative Wilson, solely in order
to "perfect" the bill. 1 °
When the bill, with the additional language, was
In his speech after the veto, Representative Lawrence explained that the
extension of apparently absolute rights to all citizens does not preclude the
State from making reasonable regulations. He quoted Chancellor Kent to the
effect that citizens "are entitled to the privileges that persons of the same
description are entitled to." Id. at 1835 (Rep. Lawrence). Lawrence then stated
that this principle is applicable to the Act: "That is, distinctions created by
nature of sex, age, insanity, &c., are recognized as modifying conditions and
privileges, but mere race or color, as among citizens, never can." Id.
Thus, the relevant legislative history shows that the disputed language was
intended simply to make clear that States may make reasonable regulations,
including those based on age, gender, and capacity. Nothing in the language
was intended to limit the bill to proscribing only race discrimination. See
Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin The Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and
Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45, 56 (1987).
In short, the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" was added only in
order to make clear that the rights of all citizens, like those of white citizens,
are subject to reasonable State regulations-an obvious caveat under thenprevailing natural law theory. Under this reading, discrimination based on
family lineage would clearly be prohibited-the Revolution and its elaboration
in the North had made clear that discrimination on that ground was not
reasonable. And while the members of the 39th Congress believed that
discrimination based on gender was reasonable, and expressly said so, the
natural-law theory that undergirds this reading of the 1866 Act-a natural law
whose meaning and content are understood differently over time-would
require a Court to conclude that the Act proscribes such discrimination today.
308. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 291, 295-96
(1976).
309. Id. at 291.
310. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866) (Rep. Wilson). Wilson
made the motion on his own initiative, and not at the request of the Judiciary
Committee, which he chaired. Id.
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returned to the Senate, Senator VanWinkle asserted that,
"these words are superfluous. The idea is that the rights of
all persons shall be equal; and I think leaving out these words
would attain that object."3 1 Agreeing that the addition was
"superfluous," the bill's author, Senator Trumbull, asserted
that, "in the opinion of the [Senate Judiciary] committee
which examined this matter [the added phrase] did not alter
the meaning of the bill."312 The Committee "did not think it
worth-while to send the bill back just because those words
were inserted by the House."31 3
The disputed phrase would hardly have been deemed
superfluous-not even worth a discussion-if the effect was to
limit the scope of the bill to protecting only racial groups
narrowly defined. Before the addition, the Republicans had
already: (1) rejected citizenship based on family lineage, (2)
characterized the protected rights as belonging to individuals,
(3) expressly invoked the no-hereditary-privilege principles of
the Declaration and Constitution, (4) demonstrated an intent
to suppress southern aristocracy, and (5) committed
themselves to safeguarding the social mobility promised by
Free Labor ideology. Congress clearly did not believe that the
addition of the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" had
the effect of limiting these repeatedly articulated objectives.
b.

The Act Protects Whites Only as Familiesor
Individuals.

McDonald also undermines legacy proponents' reliance
on the "white citizens" phrase by holding that the Act protects
whites against racial discrimination.1 4 The Act can protect
whites against discrimination based on their racial group only
if the phrase "same right . . as is enjoyed by white citizens"
includes the right to contract without regard to one's family
lineage. Under the Act, each person, including each white
person, is entitled to the same rights as are enjoyed by white
citizens. To suggest that the 1866 Act protects individuals
only against discrimination based on membership in a racial
311. Id. at 1413 (Sen. VanWinkle).
312. Id. (Sen. Trumbull).
313. Id.
314. The Court's holding was based on extensive legislative history
establishing that Congress intended to protect whites. See McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976).
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group is to suggest, contrary to McDonald, that the Act does
not protect whites.
By definition, whites as members of a racial group enjoy
the same rights as white citizens, so the Act would never
provide any protection to them if it protected against only
racial-group discrimination.
The Act protects individual
whites by ensuring that they enjoy the same rights as all
other white citizens-by protecting against discrimination
based on family lineage. Congress's use of the phrase "same
right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens" posits a unitary
group of whites, all of whom enjoy the same rights without
distinction.
Moreover, it was necessary for the 1866 Act to prohibit
discrimination based on family lineage in order for it to
prohibit
racial-group discrimination against African
Americans. Recall that at the outbreak of the Civil War, only
10,000 families were in control of the political and economic
life of the South. 15 If the 1866 Act had not prohibited
discrimination based on family lineage, the southern
aristocrats could have enacted legislation to the effect that
only the descendants of those 10,000 families would enjoy the
substantive rights enumerated in the 1866 Act.316 Many
blacks would have been left unprotected because they would
have enjoyed the same right as whites-the right to make
contracts, inherit, testify, etc., only if they were descended
from one of the favored families. 1 7
315. See supra text accompanying note 147.
316. This is no mere hypothetical. Blacks as well as "poor whites of the
South" were in real jeopardy because "State governments are already in the
hands of those hostile, through prejudice or interest, to their improvement or
amelioration."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3035 (1866) (Sen.
Henderson); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1867) (Sen.
Morton). In fact, the planter oligarchs enacted legislation providing that any
laborer-black or white-without gainful employment could be arrested and
then sold into servitude. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 112
(1866) (Sen. Henderson); EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION (FROM APRIL 15, 1865 TO JULY 15,
1870) 30, 39 (1969). Congress clearly understood that such legislation was
prohibited by the 1866 Act.
317. The Southern oligarchs ultimately regained political control of the South
by, among other methods, disenfranchising not only blacks but also poor whites.
See Forbath, supra note 177, at 179. Poor whites were duped into supporting
restrictions on voting rights by the inclusion of "grandfather clauses" that
appeared to exempt them from poll taxes and literary tests, but that in fact
often had "sunset" provisions. See Burton D. Wechsler, Black and White
Disenfranchisement: Populism, Race, and Class, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 23, 48-49
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The legislative history overwhelmingly supports the AlKhazraji Court's indication that the Act prohibits
discrimination based on family lineage. That conclusion has
the additional salutary effect of not requiring federal courts to
categorize persons according to racial group. The Court has
required plaintiffs under the Act to prove that they belong to
the "kind of group that Congress intended to protect."3 1 As
shown above, the types of groups that Congress intended to
protect include groups defined by their lineage.
Courts therefore need not determine whether a plaintiff
is a member of any particular racial group. Nor need courts
limit the Act's protections to "races" that were specifically
mentioned during the 1866 debates, thereby absurdly leaving
unprotected,
for example,
Norwegian-Americans
and
Hispanic-Americans, who by happenstance were not
mentioned in those debates.3 19
3 2 ° Homer
More than 110 years ago in Plessy v. Ferguson,
Plessy, who was one-eighth black, was discriminated against
by whites because they viewed him as belonging to a different
(2002) (quoting opponents who argued that grandfather clauses created "an
hereditary right or privilege" that violated "the spirit that has animated the
people of this country from the Declaration of Independence down to this time,"
and were "counterrevolutionary" because the Revolution had been "a struggle to
abolish heredity").
Although the Supreme Court ultimately found these
grandfather clauses to be unlawful under the 15th Amendment, Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), by then the use of poll taxes, literary tests,
and property requirements had disenfranchised most southern blacks and
thousands of poor southern whites. Wechsler, supra at 56.
318. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987). The
Court was responding to a particular difficulty-is discrimination against Jews
based on religion (which is not covered by the Act), or on ancestry or ethnicity,
which is covered? The Court held that, whatever may be thought to be the case
today, the 39th Congress considered Jews to be a distinct racial group and
therefore discrimination against them to be prohibited by the statute. Id. at
617-18. In short, they were "the kind of group that Congress intended to
protect" because they were a group, as the 39th Congress understood it, defined
by race/lineage rather than religion.
319. See Mary J. Woodhead, Ethnic Origin Discrimination as Race
DiscriminationUnder § 1981 and § 1982, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 741, 755-58 (1989)
(noting that lower courts after Al-Khazraji have tried to decide whether
Norwegian-Americans and Hispanic-Americans constitute "races," and urging
that courts should get out of the business, "once and for all . . .of categorizing
humans in racial categories").
320. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

120

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

race. In just the last forty years, the number of interracial
marriages in the United States has increased more than one
hundred-fold. 21 So assume that the Plessy-like plaintiff of
today is a person descended in equal parts from ancestors
Norwegian, Latvian, Russian, English, Chinese, Japanese,
Columbian, Peruvian, Brazilian, Australian, Canadian,
French, Turkish, Saudi, Indonesian, and one ancestor
descended from Sally Hemings.
When the defendant
discriminates against plaintiff on the ground that she is not
"Aryan," should the courts engage in their own brand of racial
categorizing by trying to decide whether plaintiff is "Chinese"
or "African American"-her antecedents that are mentioned
in the 1866 debates? 322 It is far better for courts to do what
Congress intended and what Al-Khazraji permits-to
conclude that defendant has discriminated against plaintiff
on the prohibited basis of lineage, and to leave only the
defendant to ponder about plaintiffs "race."323
321. See SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at 85.
322. Justice Kennedy has addressed the fundamentally arbitrary and
dangerous use of racial classifications by courts. See Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is
inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society."); Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 633 n.1 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe very attempt to define with precision a beneficiary's
qualifying racial characteristics is repugnant to our constitutional ideals.")
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); see also Ortiz v. Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 565 (E.D. Cal.
1982) ("The notion of race is a taxonomic device and, as with all such constructs,
it exists in the human mind not as a division in the objective universe."); LaFore
v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Colo. 1978) ("The use of
racial classifications or distinctions in political or judicial functions is fraught
with peril.").
323. The 1866 Act's prohibitions on lineage-based discrimination by private
actors do not, as some may suggest, render the Act over-broad. Nothing in the
Act requires the conclusion that parents, when acting in their capacity as
parents, are prohibited from preferring their own children. The language and
history of the Act reveal no intention to pierce intra-family transactions. Nor
does the Act prohibit government or other social entities from helping parents to
prefer their own children. For example, government may appropriately enact
intestacy laws that mimic and implement the decision that appropriately
belongs to a parent to prefer his or her own child. Government may likewise
appropriately help parents fulfill their obligations by providing financial
assistance or benefits to children.
Regardless of whether the "race"
discrimination proscribed by the Act is defined broadly or narrowly, courts must
draw private/public boundaries around it. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 187-88 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Larson, supra note 4, at
1413-16 (discussing ways to limit reach of nobility clauses). Courts can draw
the line more or less narrowly depending on whether the discriminatory animus
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III. LEGACY PREFERENCES DO NOT NARROWLY SERVE
A COMPELLING INTEREST
Without attempting to develop a full "strict scrutiny"
analysis of legacy preferences, we briefly address the
principal justifications that the universities are likely to
offer.3 24 We show that: (1) in contrast to the affirmative
action plan in Grutter, legacy preferences do not promote
student-body diversity; (2) the universities' interest in alumni
donations is not a cognizable justification; and (3) factually,
the universities likely could not prove that legacy preferences
positively affect private donations or are narrowly tailored to
achieve a legitimate objective.
A. Legacy PreferencesDisserve the Goal of Student Body
Diversity.
The universities may argue that legacy preferences
survive strict scrutiny because legacy status is only one of
numerous factors in an individualized review of each
3 25
application, just as was approved in Grutter.
This
is based on racial group or family lineage. Given the disparate histories of these
two types of race discrimination in America, competing constitutional values
may tolerate them to differing degrees. In any event, these constitutional
concerns are not implicated by admissions policies at private schools. Runyon,
427 U.S. at 175-78 (majority opinion); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U.S. 69, 78 (1984) ("[T]here is no constitutional right .. .to discriminate in the
selection of who may attend a private school."). The private universities here
appeal to the public at large for customers, are purportedly open in principle to
all objectively qualified applicants, are "private" only in the sense that they are
owned and managed by private persons, and receive tens or hundreds of
millions of dollars annually in public funds. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172 n.10
(1976); see also Developments in the Law-Section 1981, supra note 232, at 119
("[Tlhe larger the pool of contractual partners the defendant solicits, the less
plausible the claim that the personal identity of the parties is important to the
contractual relation. A defendant who serves the public generally or who
advertises would fail the test."). Whatever the outer constitutional boundaries
of the Act, the conduct at issue here is well within them.
324. It is not clear whether the analytic framework under the Guaranteestrict scrutiny, compelling interest, narrow tailoring-is also directly applicable
under the 1866 Act. See, e.g., Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 470 F.3d 827, 837
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (applying burden-shifting framework similar to that
under Title VII).
Regardless of the precise framework used, private
universities, like their public counterparts, will bear a substantial burden to
justify legacy preferences.
325. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In Grutter, the Court upheld
the University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions policy. Id.
The Court held that the policy was subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Guarantee, that the school had a compelling interest in obtaining a
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argument fails because it bypasses the critical, initial step of
identifying the university's interest.
In Grutter, the
preference in favor of otherwise-under-represented racial
minorities served the school's interest in achieving student
body diversity. 26 And the preference was appropriately
narrow because it was only one of numerous factors in a
holistic evaluation of each application. 27 Legacy preferences,
in stark contrast, do not serve the goal of student body
diversity, so they are not redeemed by being only one factor in
an individualized review.
Grutter asserts that "nothing less than the 'nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure'
to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of
many peoples."3 2 Accordingly, "attaining a diverse student
body is at the heart of the [university's] proper institutional
mission."3 29
Student-body diversity also promotes good
citizenship and stabilizes society by ensuring that access to
higher education is "visibly open" to all: "all members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness
and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this
training."330
Legacy preferences undermine this essential diversity.
The vast majority of students at elite universities come from
the narrow bands of the highest socioeconomic strata. At the
146 most selective schools, seventy-four percent of the
students come from the top quartile of socioeconomic status,
while only three percent come from the bottom quartile, and
only ten percent from the bottom half."'
Nationwide, thirty-five percent of all families with
children under eighteen earn less than the threshold to
diverse student body, and that the means of achieving that goal were
appropriately narrow because race was only one factor in a holistic evaluation of
each application. Id.
326. Grutter,539 U.S. at 316, 325.
327. Id. at 334.
328. Id. at 324 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
329. Id. at 329.
330. Id. at 332 (emphasis added); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2818 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(strict scrutiny is necessary when government uses race "to decide who will
receive goods and services that are normally distributed on the basis of merit
and which are in short supply").
331. CARNEVALE & ROSE, supra note 31, at 11.
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receive Pell grants. 32 Yet the weighted average percentages
of students receiving those grants at the top twenty-five
national universities and top twenty-five liberal arts colleges
(as ranked by U.S. News & World Report) in 2001-2002 was
16.1% and 12.7% respectively. 333 To reflect the national
mean, a school should receive an average of $824 in Pell grant
funds per undergraduate. 34 Yet only three of the seventy-five
most elite national universities and two of the seventy-five
best liberal arts schools meet that benchmark, 131 with the
weighted averages being $445 and $335, respectively. 3 6
Legacy preferences reinforce this existing class stratification
at elite universities. 7
Nor is this pernicious effect any less if diversity is
measured by race rather than class. Given the nation's
history, it is no surprise that the beneficiaries of legacy
preferences are overwhelmingly white.
Nationwide, the
percentage of African Americans, Hispanics, and Native
Americans in the legacy pool is half that of their percentage of
all applicants and a small fraction of their percentage of the
overall population.3
Data show why African American and Hispanic
332. See DANETTE GERALD & KATIE HAYCOCK, ENGINES OF INEQUALITY:
DIMINISHING

EQUITY IN THE NATION'S PREMIER

(2006); see also SACKS, supra note 32, at 162.
333. We obtained our data from RICHARD D.

PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES

15

KAHLENBERG, AMERICA'S

UNTAPPED RESOURCE: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 160-65

tbl.A. 1 (2004).
334. For the 2005-2006 school year, the average Pell Grant per recipient,
among all undergraduates nationwide, was $2,354. See College Board, Trends
in Student Aid, TRENDS HIGHER EDUC. SERIES, 2006, at 5. Among families with
children under eighteen, thirty-five percent earn less than the grant threshold.
GERALD & HAYCOCK, supra note 332, at 5. So we calculate an expected average

of $824 per undergraduate.
335. The national universities were UC San Diego, UC Davis, and Penn
State; the liberal arts schools were Berea College and Spelman College.
336. The data are from 2005-2006 in our database, described infra Part IIIC.
337. See SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at 17 (legacy preferences help the wealthy
"tighten[] their grip on most selective colleges"); see also CARNEVALE & ROSE,
supra note 31, at 32 ("[W]e are increasingly clustered into families with both
high-parental education and income and families with neither high-parental
education nor income.").
338. SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at 31; see also Thomas J. Espenshade & Chang
Y. Chung, The Opportunity Cost of Admission Preferences at Elite Universities,
86 SOC. Sci. Q. 293, 298-301 (2005); Mark Megalli, So Your Dad Went to
Harvard: Now What About the Lower Board Scores of White Legacies? 7 J.
BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 71, 72 (1995); John K. Wilson, The Myth of Reverse
Discriminationin HigherEducation, 10 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 83, 91 (1995).
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legislators in Texas were outraged when Texas A&M
University proposed to continue legacy preferences while
eliminating race-based affirmative action.
For example,
Hispanic students comprised just nine percent of the student
population in 2000, but constituted fully thirty-two percent of
the population of Texas:
Table 2. Texas A&M Demographics Compared to Texas Population

White
Hispanic/Latino
Black
Asian

Texas A&M Student

Texas

Population 2000 (%) *

Population 2000 (%) **

82
9
2
3

71
32
11.5
2.7

Peter Schmidt, Pressure Put On Colleges to End Legacies in Admissions, 50
Chron. Higher Educ. Al (2004).
** U.S. Census (note that individuals may report more than one race, so the
percentages total more than 100%).
*

Before the Texas legislature ended Texas A&M's legacy
preferences in 2004, they were the deciding factor in annually
gaining admission for more than 300 white students but
fewer than 6 blacks. 3 9
Even with affirmative action, racial minorities will be
underrepresented in the pool of legacy applicants far into the
future. African Americans at the University of Virginia, for
example, comprised only three percent of legacy applicants in
2002 while comprising ten percent of the entering student
body.3 40 Even with a strong affirmative action program, the
racial composition of the legacy pool at UVa will not match
that of the current student body-let alone that of the
Virginia population-until the year 2020. 1'
Thus, the legal analysis never gets to the question of
whether use of legacy preference as one factor in a holistic
339. See Texas Civil Rights Review, Legacy Admissions Questioned at Texas
A&M,
(Jan.
3,
2004),
http://texascivilrightsreview.org/phpnuke/modules.php?name=News&file=artiel
e&sid=23.
340. Howell & Turner, supra note 12, at 342. Note that the same story is
true in reverse at historically black schools that grant legacy preferences. Id. at
348 n.5.
341. Id. at 326.
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evaluation of an application would be narrowly tailored to
serve the goal of student body diversity. Legacy preferences
undermine, rather than serve, that goal. Put differently,
schools could try to justify legacy status as one factor in a
holistic evaluation designed to achieve student body diversity
only by assigning that status negative rather than positive
weight.
B. The Universities' Stated Interest in IncreasingRevenue by
GrantingLegacy Preferences Is Not Legally Cognizable.
Unable to rely on an interest in student body diversity,
the universities have asserted that legacy preferences are
alumni
justified because they encourage increased
42 This is just the latest iteration of an argument
donations.
that has been repeatedly used over the last century to justify
In the days of quotas on the
unlawful discrimination.
admission of Jews, for example, Ivy League administrators
denied that they personally wished to discriminate-they
merely recognized that other students were bigots and would
be driven away if the quotas were not enforced. 43 Harvard
expressly linked this "realist" concern to a potential effect on
Alumni and other groups predicted
alumni giving."'
similarly dire financial consequences from the admission of
women and racial minorities in the 1960s and 70s.345 Yet
today these universities' endowments stand at record levels.
Regardless of the ignominious history of the universities'
asserted interest in raising revenue from legacy preferences,
that interest simply is not legally cognizable. The law cannot
recognize the receipt of revenue from the discrimination's
beneficiaries as a legitimate interest. To contend that the
recipients of a preference are willing to pay for it is simply to
restate that the recipients have obtained something of value.
The Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas could not have
justified its racially segregated schools by asserting that the
white parents would have been more amenable to tax
342. Id. at 330 (purpose of preferences is "to keep . . . alumni happy -- and
donating"). The universities have also asserted other, more "fuzzy" interests,
such as fostering alumni goodwill and loyalty. We show that the alleged
tangible manifestation of that goodwill and loyalty-increased donations-does
not survive analysis, so a fortiori neither do the amorphous precursors.
343. KARABEL, supra note 2, at 87-88.
344. Id. at 174.
345. See id. at 459-60; see also KAHLENBERG, supra note 33, at 235 n.75.
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increases if the schools remained all white.346 The State of
California in Takahashi could not have justified its denial of
fishing permits to those of Japanese ancestry by asserting
that the white fishermen would have accepted increased fees
on their own licenses in gratefulness for the State's exclusion
of the Japanese competitors.347
In Plyler v. Doe, the State of Texas tried to justify the
denial of a free education to undocumented resident children
by pointing to the need to preserve scarce funds for the
education of lawful residents. 4 s The proffered justification
was not cognizable: "[A] concern for the preservation of
resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification
used in allocating those resources."3 49 To assert that denial of

a benefit to the disfavored class will save resources is simply
to "justify .

.

. classification with a concise expression of an

intention to discriminate."35 ° The dissenters in Plyler agreed
that "fiscal concerns alone could not justify discrimination
against a suspect class or an arbitrary and irrational denial of
benefits to a particular group of persons."351

C. The Universities Likely Cannot Sustain Their Burden of
Proofon the Existence of a PreferencePremium.
In any event, the universities likely could not prove that
legacy preferences result in greater contributions.
The
universities contend that some portion of an alumnus's
contribution is made for the usual reasons (e.g., gratitude for
an education, fondness for the institution or professors, etc.),
but that some other portion represents what we call a
"Preference Premium"-a voluntary payment for having
personally been the beneficiary of a legacy preference or for
having one's child or grandchild potentially be the
beneficiary. The available evidence indicates that no such
346. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
347. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); see supra note
246.
348. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982). Here, the universities' resources
are hardly "limited." In 2004, the endowments of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton
stood at $22.6, $12.7, and $9.6 billion, respectively. KARABEL, supra note 2, at
151. They are substantially larger today.
349. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
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Preference Premium exists.5 2
The universities have never offered anything other than
bald assertions or, at most, anecdotal evidence, to support the
existence of a Preference Premium. 3 When directly asked by
the Department of Education 35 4 to provide evidence of a link
between
legacy
preferences
and increased
alumni
contributions, Harvard was unable to do so, asserting that its
data on the issue "is355not something that would lend itself to
statistical analysis."
Moreover, evidence of a correlation between legacy
preferences and increased giving by alumni would not satisfy
352. In asserting that a Preference Premium does exist-that a significant
purpose of alumni contributions is to obtain the legacy preferences-the
universities will have to tread very carefully. If the donor's "primary motive" in
making a donation is to receive a personal benefit, the contribution is not tax
deductible. See, e.g., Babilonia v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 678, 679 (9th Cir.
1982).
By asserting a link between legacy preferences and alumni
contributions, the universities raise an issue as to the deductibility of those
contributions, and as to the universities' own liability for failing to advise the
donors of the non-deductibility. See infra note 375.
353. See, e.g., Kathrin Lassila, Why Yale Favors Its Own: Interview with Yale
University President Rick Levin, YALE ALUMNI MAG. Nov-Dec 2004, at 28,
available at http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2004-li/q_a.html. The
Dean of Admissions at the University of Virginia, for example, has asserted that
legacy alumni in one fundraising campaign donated at a significantly higher
rate and gave an average of $34,800 each, compared to an average gift of only
$4,100 from non-legacy alumni. See SCHMIDT, supra note 2, at 29. Evidence
from one fundraising campaign is not probative, and on its face this anecdotal
evidence suggests that a few very large donations skewed the results.
354. See Letter and Enclosure: Statement of Findings, Compliance Review
01-88-6009 from Thomas J. Hibino, Acting Reg'l Director of U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
Office for Civil Rights, to Derek Bok, President of Harvard Univ., supra note 20.
At the request of an Asian American applicant, the Department's Office for Civil
Rights ("OCR") investigated Harvard's legacy preference policy. The OCR found
that the policy had the effect of awarding the equivalent of thirty-five additional
SAT points (1600-point scale) to legacy applicants, id. at 37 (Statement of
Findings), and had a significant adverse impact on Asian Americans, who
constituted 15.7% of applicants but only 3.5% of legacy applicants, id. at 35; see
generally KARABEL, supra note 2, at 506.
355. See Scott Jaschik, Doubts Are Raised About U.S. Inquiry on Harvard
Policies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. Feb. 6, 1991, at Al; see generally KAHLENBERG,
supra note 33, at 234 n.75. Despite the findings of disparate impact and the
absence of a viable justification, the OCR nevertheless concluded that the
preferences were lawful, noting that they were longstanding and not unique to
Harvard. Letter and Enclosure: Statement of Findings, Compliance Review 0188-6009 from Thomas J. Hibino, Acting Reg'l Director of U.S. Dep't of Educ.,
Office for Civil Rights, to Derek Bok, President of Harvard Univ., supra note 20,
at 40; see also Jasichik, supra (OCR spokesman giving explanation); see
generally KARABEL, supra note 2, at 505. "White-wash" is not too strong a term
to describe the OCR's performance.
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the universities' burden. Alumni donations typically account
for only about twenty-eight percent of private giving to
universities." 6 Some of the seventy-five percent of Americans
who oppose legacy preferences presumably withhold or reduce
their donations as a result of the preferences.3 57
The
universities' onus, therefore, is to prove that elimination of
the preferences would cause overall net donations, not just
donations from alumni, to decrease.
On the broadest view, it seems highly unlikely that
legacy preferences have any substantial positive effect on
university revenues. A recent study suggests that, to the
extent that alumni with children give more than do alumni
without children, they do so not because they are grateful for
legacy preferences, but because they believe (without any
evidence) that the donations themselves will influence the
universities to admit their children. 5 8 Increased donations
are temporally clustered around the time of the admissions
decision and stop soon after that decision is made. 9
Other aspects of the study confirm that legacy
preferences are unlikely to positively affect private giving.
Among alumni contributions, the top one percent of gifts
account for approximately seventy percent of the total dollar
value 6 ° Alumni who make gifts of that magnitude are not
dependent on legacy preferences to get special consideration
for their children. Thus, only thirty percent of alumni gifts,
and only 8.4% of total private gifts, are potentially positively
356. See Daniel Golden, Family Ties: Preference for Alumni Children in
College Admission Draws Fire, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at Al.

357. See supra text accompanying note 28; see also Op-Ed., End Legacy
Preference, HARVARD
CRIMSON,
Dec.
13,
2006,
available at
http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=516360 (stating that the practice of
legacy preferences "is on its face unfair" and urging the University to take the
"moral high ground" and end it); Sam Post, Fix Admissions by Trashing the
Legacy

Admit,

YALE

HERALD,

Oct.

13,

2006,

available

at

http://www.yaleherald.com/article.php?Article=4921. There is apparently at
least one organized effort to withhold contributions as a protest against legacy
preferences. See GOLDEN, supra note 12, at 258.
358. See Jonathan Meer & Harvey S. Rosen, Altruism and the Child-Cycle of
Alumni Donations, 29-30 (CEPS, Working Paper No. 150, 2007). Importantly,
there is no reason to believe that this phenomenon would be affected by the
elimination of the legacy preference. Alumni parents who believe, without any
evidence, that their increased donations will positively affect their child's
application can continue harboring that belief after the legacy preferences are
eliminated.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 8.
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influenced by legacy preferences. The same study showed
that fifty-three percent of the children of alumni applied to
their parent's alma mater.3 61 Lifetime giving was elevated
among the parents of those who applied, with forty-eight
percent of their giving attributable to an expected effect on
the admittance decision, and fifty-two percent attributable to
altruism. 6 2 Thus, even if the non-altruism portion were
attributable to the legacy preference rather than an expected
effect on the decision, only 6.1% of alumni giving, and only
1.7% of total private giving, would be potentially positively
affected by legacy preferences. 63 Any positive effect would
then be netted against any negative effect on giving by nonalumni and by conscientious alumni.
In order to test the conclusion that legacy preferences
likely have no substantial positive effect on private giving, we
compiled a database of the top seventy-five national
universities 364 and top seventy-five liberal arts colleges 365 as
ranked in the 2007 edition of U.S. News & World Report. Of
these 150 schools, we were able to confirm that 102 grant
legacy preferences and seventeen do not; of the latter, eight
stopped granting legacy preferences within the past fifteen
The database includes the alumni giving rates
years.
(percentage of alumni who make a contribution of any
amount), the amount of revenue received from private gifts
and contracts, and a host of other variables, for each year
from 1992 to 2006.366 Data on private gifts was not readily
361.
362.
363.
alumni

Id. at 13.
Id. at 24.
Alumni gifts other than the top one percent equal thirty percent of
contributions; approximately eighty percent of the U.S. population ever

have children, JANE LAWLER DYE, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 2004

tbl.6, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p20-555.pdf. Lifetime
contributions are elevated among the fifty-three percent of alumni whose
children apply to their alma maters; and forty-eight percent of these
contributions are not attributable to altruism. The result is that 6.1% of alumni
contributions are potentially positively affected by legacy preferences, and
alumni giving typically accounts for twenty-eight percent of total private giving.
364. The database is available at Steve D. Shadowen, et al., No Distinctions
Except Those Which Merit Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences
in Public and Private Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 53 (2009),
http://law. scu.edu/lawreview/legacynationalcolleges.cfm.
365. The database is available at Steve D. Shadowen, et al., No Distinctions
Except Those Which Merit Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences
in Public and Private Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 53 (2009),
http://1aw.scu.edu/lawreview/legacyliberalarts.cfm.
366. The alumni giving rates were obtained from U.S. News & World Report,
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available, so a potential weakness in the database is that it
includes private gifts and contracts as a single data point. 6 7
We used regression analyses to determine whether
certain variables were correlated with greater private gifts
and contracts or greater alumni giving rates. 65 The data
show positive, statistically significant correlations with
smaller student body, higher selectivity in admissions (very
low acceptance rate), and being a private rather than public
university.
The data show no statistically significant
correlation between legacy preferences and either alumni
giving rate or private gifts and contracts:
Table 3. Summary of Regression Results
Dependent Variable

Real Gifts

R 2 = 0.27

R 2 = 0.35

R2 = 0.57

3,089,926
(44,979,401)

20221.00
(8843)**

8994.97
(5505)

35.50
(6.22)***

-1,102
(8,398)

-0.80
(1.65)

-0.94
(1.02)

-0.003**
(.001)

5,259
(770)***

-0.02
(0.15)

-0.06
(.09)

-0.0005
(.0001)***

-2,262,412
(312,860)***

-308.31"**
(61.5)

-229.30***
(38)

-0.18
(.04)***

R2=

Intercept

Pell grants per
undergrad
Number of
undergrads
Acceptance
Rate

Real Gifts per
Undergrad
Real Gifts
(excluding
per
CalTech and
Alumni
Undergrad
MIT)
Giving Rate

0.38

and the data for private gifts and contracts were obtained from the U.S.

Department of Education.
367. This is a strength rather than a weakness if legacy preferences have a
negative influence on the awarding of grants and contracts.
368. The data show little year-to-year variation in the independent variables.
We therefore consolidated the yearly data into a single record per school (except
where a school changed its legacy policy, in which case we created pre- and postchange records for the school) in order to avoid biasing the standard errors
down and thus yielding artificially large t values. Many schools changed their
accounting methods in 2001, so we ran the regressions for the period 1992-2006
and separately for 2001-2006. We found no significant differences in the
results. The results shown in Table 3 are for the period 1992-2006.
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Table 3. Summary of Regression Results (continued)
Dependent Variable
Real Gifts per
Real Gifts

Private /
Public

Real Gifts

per
Undergrad

62,546,491
(19,358,149)***

7958.33
(3806)**

Undergrad
(excluding
CalTech and
MIT)
7106.09
(2347)***

Alumni
Giving Rate
5.30
(2.68)**

Legacy
19,781,513
-7490.28
159.38
2.30
Preference
(18,016,919)
(3542)**
(2263)
(2.49)
NOTES:
N = 141 for all regressions except where Cal Tech and MIT are dropped.
Standard errors in parentheses
*
significant at the 0.10 level
**
significant at the 0.05 level
significant at the 0.01 level

Of the eight universities that have recently terminated
legacy preferences, seven did not experience any decline in
donations/contracts after terminating the preferences. The
average annual private gifts/contracts, before and after
termination, are shown here in real (2000) dollars:
Table 4. Average Annual Private Gifts/Contracts Before and After
Termination
Before ($)
After ($)
UC Berkley
99,369,684
134,041,509
UC Davis
46,444,722
48,774,022
UC Irvine
38,003,929
39,378,062
UCLA
130,100,843
217,991,658
UC San Diego
76,138,021
81,531,122
UC Santa Barbara
14,555,300
27,514,500
U. of Georgia
43,563,034
64,975,799
Texas A&M
79,284,555
51,707,215
The only school that experienced a decrease, Texas A&M,
started experiencing a decline years before it announced the
end of legacy preferences.3 6 9 Other top Texas universities,
none of which changed their preference policies during the
369. Texas A&M began experiencing a decline in gifts/contracts in 2001, but
did not eliminate legacy preferences until 2003.

132

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1:49

relevant time, experienced a similar decline at the same time,
apparently all resulting from an economic slow-downY0°
We also found data showing that alumni of CalTech,
which grants no preferences, donated $71 million in 2007,
versus $77 million donated in 2006 by alumni of legacygranting MIT.37 1

Given that MIT has more than four times

the undergraduate population of CalTech, these figures
underscore the absence of any positive correlation between
private giving and legacy preferences.
The data that is currently publicly available refutes the
received wisdom that the preferences result in increased
private giving. Comprehensive and detailed data can be
gathered in litigation against the universities. We surmise
that these schools will find, as did Harvard, that the data "is
not something that would lend itself to statistical analysis"
that favors them.
D. Legacy PreferencesAre Not Narrowly Tailored to the Goal
of IncreasingRevenue.
Finally, even if raising revenue from the beneficiaries of
preferences were a cognizable justification that was
supported by facts, the universities would still have to show
that the preferences are a "narrowly tailored" means of
raising revenue. This is not a case, like Grutter,72 where
individualized decision-making satisfied the requirement of
narrow tailoring because the goal was student body diversity.
The universities' purported interest here is simply in raising
revenue, which they can easily do without discriminating
based on lineage. They can obtain additional government
funding, use their endowments, increase private fundraising
370. Table 5. Average Private Gifts and Contracts Per Undergraduate
Baylor
Rice
A&M
UT
SMU

1991-2000 ($)
3,614
25,383
2,432
1,940
11,454

2001-2005 ($)
2,627
20,345
1,371
2,080
6,448

371. See MIT Alumni Association, MIT Reports to the President (2005-2006),
http://web.mit.edu/annualreports/pres06/24.00.pdf;
CalTech, Annual Report
(2006-2007),
http://www.giving.caltech.edu/CA/documents/2007%20annual%20report.pdf.
372. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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efforts, and cut administrative expenses. It is exceedingly
unlikely that the elite institutions that use legacy preferences
face such "direly limited [resources] that some form of
'education triage' might be deemed a reasonable (assuming
that it were a permissible) response."373
Indeed, our
regression analyses show that if eliminating legacy
preferences caused schools to lose any private gifts, the
reduction was offset by an increase in grants and contracts. 7
The universities can raise revenue through the
admissions process itself. A few large contributions account
for seventy percent of total alumni donations.3 75
The
universities can make these few admissions spots generate
revenue to account for 100% (and likely more) of current
alumni giving by simply selling the few spots on the open
market. By expanding the market to whom the seats are
sold, requiring that the purchase price clear the market, and
offering guaranteed admission rather than a mere preference,
the universities will drastically increase the revenues
generated from the seats. All but these few spots can then be
filled based on merit.
Selling the seats on the market would also end the
intolerable current policy which forces the victims of legacy
preferences to pay for them. The universities' argument is
that legacy preferences are valuable benefits bestowed on all
of their alumni, some of whom will make larger donations in
gratitude. The alumni/donors take tax deductions in the full
amount of their donations, without reduction for the value of
the Preference Premium. Thus, the non-legacy applicants,
who are also taxpayers, are subsidizing the preferences that
are denied to themselves and given to their competitors.
Selling admission spots on the open market would have the
37 6
added virtue of eliminating this tax gambit.
373. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 n.25 (1982).
374. See supra text accompanying note 368.
375. Meer & Rosen, supra note 358, at 8.
376. A payment to a university or other tax-exempt organization is
deductible under Section 170 of the Tax Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(iv), if the
voluntary transfer is made with no expectation of procuring a financial benefit
commensurate with the amount of the transfer. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(c)(5)
(2007). The IRS has ruled that a payment is not deductible when it is made by
an applicant's parent to a university that admits a significantly larger
percentage of applicants whose parents make contributions. Rev. Rul. 83-104,
1983-2 C.B. 46. The universities purport to avoid this ruling by arguing that
the granting of the legacy preference is not tied directly to the receipt of the
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Legacy preferences undermine, rather than serve, the
"diversity" goal that justifies preferences in favor of racial
minorities. The universities are therefore driven to try to
justify legacy preferences as a means of raising revenue. But
that justification is not legally cognizable, and, if it were, the
available data suggests that the schools could not sustain
their burden of proving that the preferences result in
increased net donations or revenue. And other available
means of raising revenue avoid the unlawful discrimination
and also avoid the obnoxious feature of forcing the victims of
legacy preferences to subsidize them.
CONCLUSION
Legacy preferences offend an American egalitarian
tradition that stretches back to the founding. They are
unlawful, rather than merely shameful, because the 39th
Congress
enacted
the principle
against hereditary
distinctions into positive law. That principle had been an
essential basis of the Revolution and was reflected in both the
Declaration's assertion of the equality of all (white) men and
in the egalitarian provisions of the 1787 Constitution,
including the guarantee of a republican form of government,
the ban on titles of nobility, and the "corruption of blood"
clauses. The Republicans of the 39th Congress who were refounding the nation consciously reached back to this
principle, broadened it to encompass a ban on discrimination
based on inherited race, and enacted it into positive law. The
parent's contribution. The preferences are granted to the children of all alumni,
regardless of whether their parents make contributions; so parents do not make
a donation with the "expectation" of receiving preferences-they are already
entitled to them.
If a court in future civil rights litigation concludes that legacy preferences
would not be lawful absent the increased contributions, then the tax analysis
changes substantially. It would then be clear that, regardless of whether a
particularparent has an expectation that the contribution will result in a
preference, all alumni parents would know that their collective increased
payments in fact are responsible for the preferences. The language of Section
170 is easily broad enough to deny the deductions under these circumstances.
The universities would then have an obligation to advise all alumni donors that
not all of their contributions are tax deductible. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B.
104; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 526, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
(2007), availableat http://www.IRS.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p526.pdf.
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ban on discrimination based on heredity is the cornerstone of
both the 1866 Act's guarantee of the "same right" to contract
and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of the equal
protection of the law.
Legacy preferences are presumptively unlawful because
they expressly grant and withhold an important benefit based
on heredity-on the identity, status, or accomplishments of
the applicant's parents.
The most frequently invoked
justification for the preferences, i.e., that they help generate
revenues for the universities, is not legally cognizable. The
beneficiaries of all unlawful discrimination presumably are
willing to pay for the privilege-the fact that a privilege has
value to its recipients tells us nothing about whether it is
warranted. And if the asserted justification were cognizable,
the universities likely cannot sustain their burden of proving
that the granting of legacy preferences results in a net
increase in revenue or donations.
Affirmative action in favor of racial minorities in college
admissions, designed (depending on one's view) to help
compensate for 400 years of oppression, help build and
sustain an African American and Hispanic middle class, and
expose college students to a diversity of cultures and views, is
subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.
It would be absurd if legacy preferences in college
admissions-affirmative action in favor of the nation's
elites-were not also subject to strict scrutiny.
Unlike
preferences in favor of racial minorities, however, legacy
preferences cannot survive the strict scrutiny to which they
are subject.
Some people may conclude in good faith that the urgent
and unquestionable benefits of preferring historically
oppressed racial minorities in college admissions are
outweighed by the principle against making distinctions
based on lineage. It seems impossible, however, for anyone to
hold that position in good faith while also supporting legacy
preferences. Yet public universities in three States continue
to grant legacy preferences even though they do not give
preferences to racial minorities. 7 7 This is where the logical,
377. The schools are the University of Florida, the University of Michigan,
and the University of Washington. Public universities in California, Georgia
and Texas have eliminated affirmative action for both racial minorities and
elites.

136

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1:49

legal, and moral disconnect between the treatment of
affirmative action for racial minorities and that for elites is
most acute.
Consequently, this is where significant, sustained
To
litigation against legacy preferences should begin."'
conclude that legacy preferences are lawful, a federal judge
would have to ignore substantial Supreme Court precedent,
backed by a long and illuminating legislative record.
Especially in the context of a shameful State policy of denying
inherited preferences to historically oppressed racial
minorities while granting those preferences to the elite, why
would a judge want to do that?

378. As noted, legacy preferences are unlawful regardless of whether a
university has affirmative action for racial minorities. We merely suggest that
as a matter of tactics the series of litigations against legacy preferences should
begin with a case against a public university that has affirmative action for
elites but not for racial minorities.

